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1 Introduction
Maternity and fertility in emerging countries are commonly thought of as high. This might
explain why there is little research on childlessness in these countries. This is however
surprising as childlessness is very much caused by poverty. When a country takes-oﬀ, poverty
recedes, and a smaller share of its inhabitants is aﬀected by subfecundity factors. When it
develops further, more of its citizens seem to make the deliberate choice of not having
children. Understanding the complex relationship between childlessness, i.e. the extensive
margin of fertility, and development is the ﬁrst objective of this paper. It is important
for our second objective: evaluating the demographic impact of development policies when
variations in the extensive margin of fertility are taken into account. We focus on three types
of development policies: ﬁghting gender inequalities, reducing child mortality and promoting
family planning.
There are two main types of childlessness which have already been discussed in the literature:
involuntary and voluntary. By deﬁnition, voluntary childlessness results from unconstrained
decision making and does not necessarily call for public intervention. Involuntary childless-
ness corresponds to the inability for women or couples to give birth. This situation arises
partly as a consequence of poverty through diﬀerent channels: more risky behavior leading
to infertility, lower chances of ﬁnding a stable partner, and higher mortality of children.
Following the theory of capabilities by Sen and Nussbaum (1993), involuntary childlessness
deteriorates poor people's capability sets. To eradicate this kind of childlessness should then
be on policy makers' agendas. Moreover, the presence of involuntary childlessness may make
total fertility increase with the standard of living (as found by Vogl (2014) for some poor
countries), hence making the demographic transition happen only once a relatively high
income or education threshold is reached.1 However, before any policy design, one should
clearly identify its relevance. Belsey (1976) shows that childlessness can be as high as 40%
in a given cohort of women in some regions or tribes of Sub-Saharan Africa. The presence
of high levels of childlessness among the poor has also been evidenced in other studies such
as Romaniuk (1980), Retel-Laurentin (1974), Poston et al. (1985), Ombelet et al. (2008),
Wolowyna (1977) and McFalls (1979). Venereal diseases and pregnancy-related infections are
the most common cause of infertility in developing countries. Frank (1983) estimates that in
Africa, 60% of the variation in total fertility was due to infertility and that a disappearance
of pathological infertility could make total fertility increase signiﬁcantly.2
1This type of childlessness is a Malthusian check, not mentioned in Malthus (1798).
2Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2015) show that, even in the United States, part of childlessness is
driven by poverty, in particular among single women; this is what they call social sterility.
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One major limit of existing studies on childlessness resides in the impossibility of distin-
guishing involuntary childlessness from voluntary childlessness in the data.3 In this paper,
we propose to estimate the composition of childlessness using quantitative theory. We provide
a uniﬁed model of marriage, childlessness and fertility whose deep parameters are identiﬁed
using Census data from 36 developing countries, from IPUMS International. From the data,
we show several recurrent facts for marriage, childlessness and fertility: at the aggregate
level, (i) the childlessness rates of both married and single women exhibit a U-shaped rela-
tionship with female years of schooling, (ii) the fertility of both single and married mothers
decreases with education and (iii) the marriage rates of males and females are high, but
highly educated women marry less than others. All these three features are veriﬁed not only
at the aggregate level but also in the vast majority of the 36 countries included in our dataset
(Appendix A.4). These patterns are used to identify the parameters of the theory.
As childlessness interacts with marriage, it is important to model both as endogenous phe-
nomena. We therefore develop a two stage marriage game. During the ﬁrst stage, people are
matched randomly with a partner of the opposite sex from their own country. For simplicity,
this match happens only once in a lifetime and no divorce is allowed. Then, people discover,
at no cost, if they are naturally sterile or not, and in case they married, if they can control
their fertility. In the last stage, singles and couples decide how much to consume and, even-
tually, how many children to have. Couples' decision making is assumed to follow a collective
negotiation process. As shown by Chiappori (1988), this framework has considerable empir-
ical support. The game is solved backward: people have to anticipate what their optimal
decisions will be in diﬀerent marital scenarios depending on their fecundity status, and then
to compare their expected utilities to decide whether to marry or not. Marriage entails costs
and beneﬁts. For men, it opens the possibility of having children. As a counterpart, some
of their time will be allocated to child-rearing. For women, a husband alleviates the time
cost of raising children. Marriage also generates economies of scale both in terms of time
and goods; indeed, spouses share expenses on household public goods and the time needed
to run a household. We accordingly assume that an individual has a lower time endowment
when single than when married. Time endowment among singles may diﬀer across genders.
3Censuses never ask childless people why they are childless. Alternative datasets, like the National
Survey for Family Growth in the United States, provide details on people's reproductive behavior and
motivation. However, these datasets contain a limited number of observations and a signiﬁcant number of
people provide contradictory answers, preventing the analyst from determining the voluntary or involuntary
nature of childlessness. Demographic and Health Surveys ask women about the ideal number of children they
would have liked to have in their lifetime irrespective of their actual number. One could imagine considering
that childless women who answer a positive number are involuntarily childless. However, nothing ensures
that the absence of children in their lifetime is not the result of a rational decision due to career perspectives,
matrimonial decisions, etc. Furthermore, even if we considered these women as involuntarily childless, we
would not have information about the causes that made them involuntarily childless women.
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These economies of scale within marriage shape marriage rates.
Because we deal with developing countries, child mortality and unwanted births are essential
ingredients of our theory. As shown in Section 2.3, survival rates are heterogenous across
countries but also across maternal education levels within countries. We assume that each
newborn has a probability of surviving to adulthood, which is country and education speciﬁc.
In line with Sah (1991), Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) and Baudin (2012), the number of children
who survive to adulthood within a family is a random variable drawn from a binomial
distribution. This implies that single women and couples have to maximize their expected
utility facing a given mortality law. To model unwanted births, we assume there are two
types of couples. Those who can control their fertility (say, Beckerian couples), and those
who cannot (say, Instinctive couples). The latter have the maximum number of children
given their time and resource constraint.4 The share of each type of couple is inferred from
the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), which ask questions on desired and actual
fertility. We assume that, contrary to couples, single women always control their fertility, as
they can more easily walk away from their partner.5
The theory produces four types of childlessness. First, voluntary childlessness is driven by
the opportunity cost of having children: a highly educated woman earns high wages and then
faces a high opportunity cost (see also Gobbi (2013) and Aaronson, Lange, and Mazumder
(2014) on this type of childlessness). Above an education threshold that depends on the
non labor income and on the time needed to raise a child, some women rationally decide
to specialize in labor market activities and have no children. The three remaining types of
childlessness are involuntary. Natural sterility refers to the innate biological impossibility
of having children, which does not depend on the level of education or wealth. The two
remaining types of childlessness are driven either by poverty or by mortality. Social sterility
concerns low-educated women and more speciﬁcally singles for whom the poverty burden
is the heaviest. For some couples, even if becoming parents is economically feasible, it can
be done only at the cost of impoverishing the couple too much. Finally, mortality driven
childlessness arises when none of the newborn children survived. In the data, child mortality
decreases with the mother's education, thus it is also correlated with poverty.
4This way of modeling unwanted births is analogous to the spender-saver model in which some households
are maximizing agents and are therefore subject to a Euler condition, while others spend their income as they
earn it. An alternative way to model unwanted births is proposed by Bhattacharya and Chakraborty (2013)
who assume that parents have to invest in a contraception technology, and, depending on their choice, they
have a given probability of giving birth, even if that would not be their choice if the contraception technology
was costless.
5Cleland, Ali, and Shah (2006) show that among 18 Sub-Saharan countries, the median percent of single
women reporting no sexual intercourse was about 60% and that single women were more likely to use any
method of contraception than married women.
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Our ﬁrst result conﬁrm and quantify the intuition of Poston and Trent (1982).6 A one-
year increase in school-life expectancy reduces social sterility by 0.75 percentage points.
The prevalence of voluntary childlessness is also correlated with the level of development:
voluntary childlessness emerges along with economic development rises. A one-year rise in
school life expectancy increases voluntary childlessness by 0.57 percentage points. By better
understanding the relationship between childlessness and development, we can also shed new
light on the old debate about the sustainability of population growth in developing countries.
Indeed, population growth rates are intimately linked to parenthood rates. The decreasing
involuntary childlessness rates due to economic development seem to delay the demographic
transition that is predicted from a model in which only the intensive margin of fertility is
taken into account. Our results suggest that there is a threshold above which both the
fertility of mothers and motherhood rates will decline with development, leading to a fast
drop in population growth.
Our second contribution is to assess whether endogenous childlessness and marriage are
important when one wants to measure the impact of three development policies on fertility
in the long run. The policies we study are the reduction of child mortality, family planning
and female empowerment. Unlike the existing economic literature, our framework allows us
to analyze the impact of each policy on the two (intensive and extensive) margins of fertility.
A reduction in mortality rates has an ambiguous eﬀect on childlessness. A lower mortality
has a direct negative impact on childlessness among married women, but a positive eﬀect
on childlessness among single women. This latter eﬀect arises through adjustments on the
marriage market. Lower mortality rates increase the probability of having unwanted (sur-
viving) births which is a risk in terms of potential consumption loss for poor individuals, and
marriage rates decrease as a result. This implies that low-educated women are more likely to
be single and hence involuntarily childless. This highlights a Malthusian type of mechanism
on how mortality allows regulating fertility. On the whole, we ﬁnd that improving child
survival is generally neutral for net fertility in our model. These results are in line with
Doepke (2005) for whom a lower child mortality did contribute to the decline of the total
fertility rates, but not to the decline in net fertility.
Together with health policies, family planning is often seen as the workhorse of develop-
ment policies; May (2012) estimates that giving access to contraceptives reduces fertility
6Poston and Trent (1982) document that there is a U-shaped relationship between childlessness and the
development level of countries: childlessness in developing countries is high because a high proportion of
women are aﬀected by factors leading to subfecundity and consequently remain involuntarily childless, while
in developed countries women do not want to become mothers so voluntary childlessness is high. As a
country develops, childlessness decreases down to a minimum level and then increases because of voluntary
reasons.
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by between 0.5 and 1.5 children. In our framework, when married women have full control
over their fertility, there is less uncertainty concerning the outcome of the marriage and this
aﬀects marriage rates positively especially among low-educated women. Childlessness rates
are therefore lowered among low-educated women. As married women can now control their
fertility, they are also more often childless. We predict that the overall eﬀect on childlessness
is negative. This is interesting as both the completed fertility of mothers and childlessness
decrease after a shock that leads women to fully control their fertility. The conclusion we
draw from this policy analysis is that, generally, neglecting the endogenous response of mar-
riage and childlessness leads to overestimate the eﬀectiveness of family planning policies.
We predict that, accounting for the eﬀect on marriage and childlessness, this policy reduces
fertility from 3.5 to 3.0.
Female empowerment, modeled as closing the gender wage gap and hence increasing women's
bargaining power within couples, also aﬀects the prevalence and composition of childlessness.
The eﬀectiveness of promoting gender equality in lowering fertility rates is generally ampli-
ﬁed, in particular when voluntary childlessness is high. On average, closing the gender wage
gap increases total childlessness, due to an increase in voluntary childlessness. For the poor-
est countries, however, which are more concerned with the type of childlessness that is driven
by poverty, the eﬀect goes in the other direction: closing the gender wage gap decreases total
childlessness, due to its negative eﬀect on social sterility. In these countries, the overall eﬀect
on fertility is then weakened when the extensive margin of fertility is accounted for.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our database in detail. The
theoretical model is described in Section 3 while Section 4 displays the identiﬁcation strategy
for the parameters of the model. In Section 5 we analyze the eﬀect of mortality, family




We use the Census data from developing countries as harmonized by IPUMS International.
These data are especially valuable for studying trends and diﬀerentials in the core demo-
graphic processes of fertility, mortality, migration, marriage, and family composition, and
have become a major source for the reports of the U.N. Population Division (Ruggles et al.
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2015). We select the Censuses, listed in Table 7 of Appendix A.1, for which the variables
years of schooling and both children ever born and children surviving are available.7
Censuses from developed countries that are present in IPUMS International have at least
one of these three variables missing. Moreover, the major interest of the paper is on how
development policies aﬀect fertility. Developed countries are not likely to be the recipients
of such policies.
As we are interested in completed fertility, the sample we consider includes women aged
40-54 for most countries. In Jamaica, Mali and Vietnam, women over 49 are not asked the
question relative to childbirth. In South Africa women over 50 are not asked the question.
So we respectively limit the sample to 40-49 and 40-50 in these countries. We drop women
who had declared to have less children born than children that survived from the sample.
This concerns one observation in Jamaica and Uruguay, 715 observations in Senegal and 14
observations in Vietnam. We ﬁx the age range of men in accordance with the age of the male
partner of the women in the sample, dropping the lowest and highest 5% of the distribution.
This age range varies across countries as shown in Table 6 (Appendix A.1).
In the data, individuals can be married (legally or consensually), monogamously for most,
single, divorced, separated or windowed. The proportion of men and women in each type
of marital status, by country, is shown in Table 5 (Appendix A.1). This paper focuses on
two margins: marrying versus staying single, and having children versus staying childless.
It abstracts from additional margins, such as staying married versus divorcing, having more
than one wife versus being monogamous, and remarrying after widowhood versus staying
single once windowed. We therefore adjust the sample to reﬂect the concepts of the model.
We accordingly remove polygynous,8 divorced, separated and widowed men and women from
the sample.9 Polygynous couples face a diﬀerent problem than monogamous ones, while di-
vorced and widowed women experienced a change in family status during their reproductive
7Some countries were previously selected and dropped afterwards. This is the case of Guinea and Nepal.
We dropped the 1996 Guinea Census data because it did not allow women to give a polygynous response to
the question on marriage. Consequently, 0% of women aged 40-54 were reported as being in a polygynous
marriage while 45.6% of men were (see Table 5 of Appendix A.1). This prevents us from distinguishing
between monogamous unions (on which we focus the analysis) and polygynous unions. The 2001 Nepal
Census data used to be in IPUMS international but was taken out because of sampling weight errors.
8Polygyny is present in Cameroun, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
The highest percentages of polygynous unions among women are 50.6% in Senegal and 46.5% in Mali.
The fertility of mothers involved in monogamous unions is slightly higher than that of women involved in
polygynous unions. Childlessness is in general higher for polygynous women.
9The 2002 Rwanda Census data shows that 30.3% of 40-54 year old women were widowed (compared to
3.9% for men). This is much higher than in any other country. Our results for Rwanda may therefore suﬀer
from some biases, as dropping 30% of the sample may induce a large selection bias. Another extreme case
is the Dominican Republic, where 25.8% of women are in the separated/divorced/spouse absent category.
Among these, 70.7% are separated from a consensual union.
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life time, which likely aﬀected their fertility decision. By not accounting for these categories,
we neglect the possible interactions between all these diﬀerent marital statuses.10 Cohabita-
tion is very common in the English-speaking Caribbean. In Jamaica, many women who are
coded as singles are in fact in a consensual union (only those who were formally married were
coded as married). Roberts (1957) reports that 11% of women and 22% of men aged 45-54
are in common law marriages in Jamaica. We thus include women who are in a consensual
union in married women.
Multifamily households, even though they exist, are not the norm for any level of educa-
tion. 95.2% of women in our sample are in a household composed of only one family. The
percentage is however lower in some speciﬁc countries. In Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania,
the percentage of women who are in households composed by more than one family is re-
spectively 19.9%, 20.9% and 22.5%. In these three countries, half of those women living
in households composed by more than one family did not go to school (so it's around 10%
among the no school of these countries). Among singles, 90.1% of women live in a one
family type household.
In each country, we divide the population into 19 education categories at most, each cate-
gory corresponding to the number of years of schooling. The years of schooling variable
(YRSCHL) goes from None or pre-school to 18 years or more. For some countries, the
number of years of schooling has a maximum value of 12 or 13 years, which leads to under-
estimating the actual years of schooling for those who have a post secondary education.
This is true for Cambodia, Kenya, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.
For these countries, we adjusted the years of schooling using the information provided by
the EDATTAND variable which is an international recode of educational attainment. For
individuals who had completed secondary education and had a post-secondary technical
education or completed some college, we added 2 years of schooling to the required num-
ber of years to achieve high school. For those who had completed university, we added 4
years of schooling. More details on the changes to the years of schooling are provided in
Appendix A.1.
Table 7 in Appendix A.1 shows the ﬁnal number of men and women, single and married by
country in the ﬁnal sample considered. From this sample we compute the fertility rates of
mothers, childlessness rates of women, and marriage rates of men and women, with respect
to their years of schooling.
10de la Croix and Mariani (2015) show how the intensity of polygyny depends on within and across gender
inequality in a given society. Any policy is expected to aﬀect marriage rates through this margin.
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2.2 Childlessness, Fertility, and Marriage
Using the sample constructed as explained above, we now provide some facts for each country
relative to childlessness rates, the completed fertility of mothers, and marriage rates by years
of education. Both childlessness and the completed fertility of mothers are constructed from
the children surviving variable to account for child mortality. In a majority of countries,
the following facts hold. (i) childlessness rates follow a U-shaped relationship with the years
of schooling, (ii) the fertility of mothers is decreasing with the years of schooling and (iii)
the marriage rates of highly educated women are lower.
Childlessness
Tables 13 and 14 show childlessness rates by country and years of education, respectively for
single and married women. All numbers shown are based on at least 30 observations.
For single women, we see broad diﬀerences in the level of childlessness rates across countries.
Brazil, Cambodia and Vietnam have the highest levels whereas Jamaica, Kenya, South Africa
and Uganda have the lowest. This could reﬂect that the meaning of being single depends
on country-speciﬁc institutions, as already mentioned for the English-speaking Caribbean
for instance. But overall, whether countries have high or low levels of childlessness, among
women declaring themselves singles, we can see that there is either a U-shape or a J-shape
relationship linking years of schooling and childlessness rates.
Turning to married women, it is also true that the highest levels of childlessness are among
lowly and highly educated women. Childlessness rates decrease with the ﬁrst years of school-
ing in most countries. As depicted on the map of Figure 1, the countries with respectively
the lowest and the highest average childlessness rate are Rwanda, with 1.9% of married
women being childless, and Cameroon, with 16.8%. Even within continents, the distribution
of childlessness rates is very heterogenous. For instance, in Latin America, seven countries
have childlessness rates for married women below 3% (Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico,
Nicaragua and Peru) while some countries like Argentina and Uruguay are above 6%. Sim-
ilarly, vast diﬀerences can be found in Africa where, for instance, the childlessness rate in
Cameroon and Mali is above 13%, while in Rwanda it is below 2%.
Completed Fertility
Tables 11 and 12 show the completed fertility of married and single mothers respectively, by
country and years of schooling. In most cases, fertility declines with education, as predicted
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Figure 1: Childlessness rates of married women
by quality-quantity tradeoﬀ models when time is the main input to produce children: for
highly educated women, the higher value of time raises the cost of children and thereby
reduces the demand for large families. (Becker (1993); see also Galor (2011) and de la Croix
(2012)). In some cases, in particular in Africa, fertility rises with education for very low levels
of education (typically from 0 years of schooling to 1 or 2). Together with decreasing part
of childlessness with respect to education, this shows that some Malthusian factors remain
in the data. Indeed, the Malthusian model (ﬁrst exposed by Bruckner (1768)) predicts that
fertility is increasing in income.
Marriage Rates
Marriage rates for men and women, by education and country are provided in Appendix A.4,
Tables 15 and 16 respectively. In many countries, highly educated women experience mar-
riage rates that are smaller than for the rest of the population. For men, it is those with the
lowest education who marry less.
2.3 Diﬀerential Mortality across Countries
For each woman in the data, we know how many children she gave birth to and how many
of them survived. The ratio between the total number of surviving children and the total
number of births gives a measure for the synthetic survival rate, which includes both child
and young adult mortality. Table 17 reports the data on survival rates, by women's education
for each country. Each entry shows the ratio between the average number of children who
survived in one country for a number of years of schooling and the average number of children
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who were ever born in this country for this number of years of schooling. As expected,
survival rates are diﬀerent across education groups and across countries. The relationship
between mothers' education and survival rates is increasing and concave.11 Clear cross-
country inequalities appear. For instance, the average survival rate equals 72% in Sierra
Leone and 98% in Vietnam. Diﬀerences in survival rates across countries are especially large
for low levels of education. The education gradient of mortality is probably related to the
access to public medical services. The high and almost ﬂat relationship between survival
rates and education in Vietnam illustrates this point.
2.4 Unwanted births across countries
For more than two decades, demographers have discussed the way to measure the diﬀerence
between desired and completed fertility. The debate between Pritchett (1994a, 1994b) and
Bongaarts (1994) about undesired births has been magniﬁed by their opposition on the need
for family planning programs in developing countries. These authors have focused on the
proportion of births which are not desired, paying however little, or even no, attention to the
proportion of women experiencing unwanted births. In this paper, we focus on the proportion
of women who do not control their fertility. To do so, we use data from Demographic
and Health Surveys (DHS) and propose ﬁve alternative measures of uncontrolled fertility.
Appendix A.2 presents the data for all countries, while Table 1 shows the results for the
ﬁve countries with the largest female population for which we have information on singles'
fertility and on uncontrolled fertility. For all the measures, we have only considered married
women who are not in a polygynous union.
Country Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3 Measure 4 Measure 5 aj ∗ 10 bj
BRA 0.491 0.281 0.238 0.141 0.548 -0.025 0.436
COL 0.385 0.236 0.159 0.033 0.464 -0.028 0.462
PER 0.540 0.392 0.307 0.085 0.479 -0.031 0.602
ZAF 0.366 0.201 0.116 0.033 0.372 -0.011 0.265
VNM 0.490 0.419 0.211 0.026 0.354 -0.024 0.537
Table 1: Alternative measures of uncontrolled fertility. Data from DHS.
The ﬁrst measure we propose considers that a woman over 40 is unable to control her fertility
11The survival rates of children might also depend on fathers' education. We can study this relation for
married women only. A linear probability model shows that the mother's education ef is twice as important
as the father's education em in determining survival. It also shows some substitutability between parents'
education levels, as the eﬀect of the interaction term ef × em is negative for most countries.
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if the number of children ever born to her is at least two more children than her declared ideal
number.12 Under this measure (measure 1), half of the women are unable to control their
fertility. One major weakness of this measure is that the diﬀerence between the number of
children ever born and the ideal number of children can be the outcome of a rational choice.
It could, for instance, reﬂect that the husband has a higher ideal number of children together
with a higher bargaining position.13
To account for the perceived desired fertility of husbands, we use the answer to question v621
in DHS: whether the respondent believes her partner wants the same number of children,
more children or fewer children than she wants herself. We construct a second measure which
identiﬁes a woman as not controlling her fertility if she declares that her ideal fertility is at
least two fewer than her completed fertility (measure 1) and if she answered that she believed
that her partner did not want more children than herself.14 A direct implication is that the
percentage of women not controlling their fertility is lower than with measure 1. Measure 3
uses the same deﬁnition as measure 2 except that the diﬀerential between completed fertility
and the ideal number of children must be at least three instead of two.
Measure 4 relies on the idea that a woman who does not control her fertility has a very
large number of children ever born. This measure is simply the percentage of women over 40
who had at least nine children while their ideal number of children is below or equal to
four. The percentages are small compared to alternative measures. The correlation between
Measures 1 and 4 equals 0.84.
The literature about desired fertility and family planning (see for instance Pritchett (1994a))
reports the existence of an ex-post rationalization bias making women declare their ideal
number of children in conformity with their actual number of children. To control for this
bias, Measure 5 focuses on women aged between 35 and 40 who had a birth within the last
three/ﬁve years before the DHS study.15 We consider that these women did not control their
fertility if their answered not at all to the question of whether the child born in the last
three/ﬁve years was wanted at the time, later or not at all (question v367). The correlation
12The ideal number of children is given as the answer to [What is] The ideal number of children that the
respondent would have liked to have in her whole life, irrespective of the number she already has. (variable
v613 in DHS). We then use the number of births rather than with the number of surviving children because
it includes the children who did not survive.
13Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2013) ﬁnd that facilitating family planning services reduces births, in particular
among women having a husband who desires more children than themselves.
14The answer to question v621 is not available for Ecuador, Mexico and Thailand. Across the remaining 22
countries where data about male's perceived desires are available, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of linear
correlation between measures 1 and 2 is 0.77.
15We do not include very young women because the probability for a woman who is not able to control
her fertility of facing an unwanted birth increases with age.
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between Measures 1 and 5 equals 0.67.
We use measure 2 to calculate the probability for women in each education category in each
country of not controlling their fertility.16 DHS provides two measures of educational at-
tainment, respectively close to YRSCH (years of schooling) and EDATTAN (educational
attainment) in IPUMS International. Our exploration of these data gave us more conﬁdence
in the variable similar to EDATTAN, which divides the population into four education cat-
egories: no school, primary education, secondary education and higher education.17
The following linear regression model appears to be the best bivariate regression model of
the percentage of women who do not control their fertility 1− κj(ei):
1− κj(ei) = ajei + bj + εij (1)
where εij ∼ N (0, σ2j ). We use this speciﬁcation to predict the probability for a woman i with
e years of schooling of not controlling fertility in country j. Table 1 reports the estimated
values of aj and bj for a selection of countries. Table 9 shows the estimates for all the
countries for which we have the data. For some countries that are listed in Table 7, the data
needed to calculate Measure 2 are not available. For these countries, we use the estimates
of the closest country as explained in Appendix A.2. The gradient of the relationship
between the probability of not controlling her fertility and the woman's education is always
signiﬁcantly negative. Final probabilities of being a woman who cannot control her fertility,
by country and education are provided in Table 20.
3 Theory
To keep notation clear, we abstract from country speciﬁc indexes. All variables and param-
eters are country speciﬁc, but we consider one country at a time.
We consider an economy populated by heterogeneous adults, each being characterized by a
triplet: sex i = {m, f}, education e, and non-labor income a. Marriage is a two-stage game.
During the ﬁrst stage, agents are matched randomly with an agent of the opposite sex from
his or her own country. They decide to marry or to remain single. A match will end up in
a marriage only if the two agents choose to marry. During the second stage of the game,
they discover, at no cost, their reproductive abilities: are they sterile (with probability χi)
16The correlation between our measure of uncontrolled fertility and the % of desired fertility proposed in
Pritchett (1994a) (pages 44-45) for the countries included in both studies equals 0.66.
17The name of this variable in DHS datasets is v106.
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or fecund (with probability 1−χi)? For couples, are they able to control their fertility (with
probability κ) or not (with probability 1 − κ)? We consider that single women have full
control over their fertility. Next, agents decide how much to consume and, eventually, how
many children to give birth to, if any.
Preferences are identical across genders and education levels. The utility of an individual of
sex i is
u (ci, n) = ln (ci) + ln (n+ ν) , (2)
where ci is the individual's consumption, n the number of children who survive to adulthood
and ν > 0 a preference parameter.
We assume that each newborn has a country speciﬁc probability q(ef ) of surviving to adult-
hood, which depends on the education of his/her mother. This probability is independent
from the number of children born. The more educated a mother is, the smaller the probabil-
ity for a newborn of dying: q′(ef ) > 0. As in Sah (1991), the number of surviving children





 [q(ef )]n[1− q(ef )]N−n. (3)
Both N and n are integer numbers. This way of modeling mortality allows us to introduce
uncertainty on the number of children that households have. An alternative to this method
is the one used in Leukhina and Bar (2010) in which households choose the number of
surviving children. Their framework is however unable to explain the share of women that
remain childless due to mortality. One feature of binomial distributions is that events are
independent, meaning that the survival of a child is independent from the survival of his/her
siblings. Facing this type of uncertainty, parents will either have a precautionary demand
for children (overshooting of fertility) or restrain their fertility to limit the potential number
of child deaths (undershooting).18
To model couples' decision making, we assume a collective decision model following Chiappori
(1988). Spouses negotiate on cm, cf and n. Their objective function is
W (cf , cm, n) = θ u(cf , n) + (1− θ) u(cm, n)
where θ is the wife's bargaining power. Following de la Croix and Vander Donckt (2010), θ
18Following Baudin (2012), we can directly deduce from the individual utility function that parents will
have a precautionary demand only if parameter ν is not too high. The exact condition to observe a precau-
tionary demand of children is ν < q(ef )N .
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depends on relative earning power and is given by
θ ≡ 1
2
θ + (1− θ) wf
wf + wm
. (4)
We speciﬁcally assume that the negotiation power of spouses is bounded, with a lower bound
equal to θ/2, and positively related to their relative wage. The boundedness of the bargaining
power function comes from the legal aspect of marriage: spouses have to respect a minimal
level of solidarity inside marriage. wi denotes the wage of a person i which increases with
education. Wages are exogenous and computed as follows:
wf = γ exp{ρef}, wm = exp{ρem} (5)
where ρ is the Mincerian return of one additional year of education and γ denotes the gender
wage gap. Wages measure earning power, either from home production, agriculture, or as
employee.19
During the last stage of the game, each person or couple maximizes their expected utility. In
addition to the constraints imposed by their reproductive abilities, they will have to respect
two additional constraints. First, beyond natural sterility, a woman has to consume at least
cˆ in order to be able to give birth:
cf < cˆ⇒ N = 0. (6)
This assumption is discussed in Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2015) and accounts for the
fact that lower-income groups are more often exposed to causes of subfecundity than the
rest of the population, because of malnutrition, exposition to unhealthy environments, and
risky behavior.
The second type of constraint is a budget constraint. We assume that each adult is endowed
with a non labor income ai > 0 drawn from an exponential distribution Fi (β) where β is the
mean of the distribution (the inverse of the rate parameter). Non-labor income corresponds
to the income that is uncorrelated with education. The total non-labor income for a couple
equals af +am. Each household has to pay a goods cost, µ, which is a public good within the
household. This type of cost is commonly assumed in the literature and gives some incentive
to form couples (eg. Greenwood et al. (2012)).
19Looking at the variable Occupation, ISCO general that records the person's primary occupation ac-
cording to the major categories in the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations scheme for 1988,
we ﬁnd that a majority of Latin American women of our sample works as service workers and shop and
market sales. In Africa and Asia, a majority of women works as agricultural and ﬁshery workers.
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We assume that single women can have children while single men cannot. The time endow-
ment is 1 for married persons and 1− δi for singles. δi is the time cost that individuals lose
due to their singleness. Single men's consumption cm equals income minus the household
goods cost:
cm = (1− δm)wm + am − µ.
Single women can have children, their budget constraint is:
cf + φnwf = (1− δf )wf + af − µ. (7)
Each fecund individual has to share time between child rearing and working. Having children
entails a time cost φn.20 If single, the mother has to bear the full time-cost alone. Given







When married, the husband bears a share 1−α of the childrearing time. The total non-labor
income of a couple net of cost is a = am + af − µ. Their budget constraint is
cf + cm + φn (αwf + (1− α)wm) = wm + wf + a. (8)






Deﬁnition 1 B(n) denotes the remaining income of a couple having n surviving children:
B(n) = (1− αφn)wf + (1− (1− α)φn)wm + a.
We now solve the game backward, starting from the last step; the choice of fertility and
consumption given the marital status.
3.1 Behaviors during the last stage of the game
While the fertility behaviors of single men, naturally sterile women, and couples who are
unable to control their fertility are simple to analyze, the behaviors of fertile women or
households are more complex. As a woman cannot have children if she consumes less than
cˆ, N is potentially limited by income. A fecund single woman or a fecund couple can then
be in one of three diﬀerent cases: unconstrained fertility, social sterility, and limited fertility.
20We assume a child who does not survive does not cost parents anything. Relaxing this assumption
neither changes our results, nor aﬀects the estimates of childlessness rates in Section 4.
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3.1.1 Single men, sterile women and sterile couples
As men cannot have children if single, they consume all their income minus the household
goods cost. Their indirect utility then equals
Vm ≡ u((1− δm)wm + am − µ, 0).
A single woman who is infertile has the same behavior as a single man and her indirect
utility equals
V˜f ≡ u((1− δf )wf + af − µ, 0).
Finally a couple who cannot have children will share the household income such that cf =
θB(0) and cm = (1 − θ)B(0). The indirect utilities of a man and a woman engaged in a
sterile marriage are respectively equal to
U˜f ≡ u(θB(0), 0) and U˜m ≡ u((1− θ)B(0), 0).
3.1.2 Fecund single women
The expected utility of a single woman who is not sterile and gives birth to N children is
written:
En [u(cf , n)|N ] =
N∑
n=0
P (n|N)u(cf , n).
Unconstrained fertility: This case arises when af − µ + (1 − δf − φNM)wf ≥ cˆ which
means that even if she has the maximal number of surviving births, she can consume at least








P (n|N)u(wf (1− δf − φn) + af − µ, n).
When af − µ+ (1− δf − φNM)wf < cˆ the fertility rate of a single fecund woman is limited
by her income. She may then either be in the social sterility or in the limited fertility case.
Social sterility: Sterility can arise when the woman is naturally sterile but also when
af −µ+ (1− δf −φ)wf < cˆ meaning that she is too poor to have at least one surviving child
while consuming at least cˆ. In such a situation: N∗ = 0 and cf = af − µ+ (1− δf )wf .
21Notice from (7) that when af −µ ≥ cˆ, working is not necessary to have the maximal number of children.
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Limited fertility: When af −µ+(1− δf −φ)wf ≥ cˆ, a single woman can have children but
the number of children is limited by her income. Let us deﬁne N s as the maximal number
of surviving children a single woman can give birth to in the present case:
N s ∈ N ≡
⌊




We can then determine her optimal fertility as:
N∗ = argmax
N∈[0,Ns]




P (n|N)u(wf (1− δf − φn) + af − µ, n).
Notice that the three situations described above cannot exist simultaneously. We can then
denote the expected well-being of a fertile single woman as
Vf = En
[
u(wf (1− δf − φn) + af − µ, n)|N∗
]
.
3.1.3 Fecund couples controlling their fertility
The expected weighted sum of utilities of a non-sterile couple equals:
En [W (cf , cm, n)|N ] =
N∑
n=0
P (n|N)W (cf , cm, n).
As for single women, the fertility of couples is potentially limited by the income of spouses.
Unconstrained fertility: This case arises when the remaining income of the couple after
having the maximal feasible number of children NM remains greater than cˆ. This condition
is written: θB(NM) ≥ cˆ. In this case, the couple can choose their optimal number of births
between zero and NM such that:
N∗∗ = argmax
N∈[0,NM]





P (n|N)W [θB(n), (1− θ)B(n), n]
Let us now focus on poorer couples for whom θB(NM) < cˆ so that reaching NM is not
feasible. In this situation, the income of the household will determine wether the couple is
subject to social sterility or to a limitation in terms of the total number of births.
17
Social sterility: When B(1) = (1− αφ)wf + (1− (1− α)φ)wm + a ≤ cˆ then N∗∗ = 0 and
spouses share their total income as a function of negotiation powers such that {cf , cm, n} =
{θB(0), (1− θ)B(0), 0}. This kind of sterility arises when the couple is so poor that if they
had one surviving child their income would then be smaller than cˆ.22
Limited fertility: When B(1) = (1−αφ)wf + (1− (1−α)φ)wm+af +am−µ > cˆ, a couple
can have children but their maximal number of children is smaller than NM as it is limited
by their income. We denote the maximal feasible number of births as N ; when N = N , the
wife's consumption is close to cˆ and the husband's to zero:
N =
⌊
wf + wm + a− cˆ
φ(αwf + (1− α)wm)
⌋
.





P (n|N)W(cf , cm, n).
The [0, N ] set can be rewritten as [0, N˜ [
⋃





. As long as
n ≤ N˜ , cf ≥ cˆ which means that the potential income of the household is high enough
to raise the n children without depriving spouses of consumption. Once n becomes higher
than N˜ , the husband has to give his wife part of his consumption in order to enable her to
consume cˆ. If such a behavior can be optimal up to a point, once the husband's consumption
is too close to zero, the couple necessarily decides not to have children to prevent a situation
of pauperized parenthood. This situation of childlessness is driven by poverty.
As in the case of single women, the situation that prevails for a fertile couple depends on
spouses' income and only one of the previous cases prevails for a given set {wm, wf , a}. We
then denote Um ≡ En[u(cf (n), n)|N∗∗] the expected well-being of a woman engaged in a
fecund marriage while U f ≡ En[u(cm(n), n)|N∗∗] is the expected well-being of the husband.
3.1.4 Fecund couples who do not control their fertility
With probability 1− κ, a couple is unable to control their fertility. In this case, we assume
that spouses have as many children as they can. Such a situation is relevant only if the total
income of the family is suﬃcient to allow the woman to consume cˆ; couples having incomes
such that B(1) ≤ cˆ are not concerned by uncontrolled fertility (they are concerned by social
22When B(1) = cˆ, the woman can have one child but then her husband has zero consumption.
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sterility). For the others, their number of children, denoted N̂ , equals:
N̂ =
N if B(NM) < cˆθNM otherwise.
Once maximal fertility has been reached, each spouse's consumption is:
{cf , cm} =
{cˆ, wf + wm − φ(αwf + (1− α)wm)N̂ − cˆ} if B(NM) ≤ cˆθ{θB(NM), (1− θ)B(NM)} otherwise
In the ﬁrst case, the husband has to give his wife some of his consumption in order to allow
her to have the maximal number of children. Such a situation is not optimal as the couple
did not choose it. This will be important when men evaluate the opportunity to marry the
woman they have been matched with on the marriage market: if their potential bride has
a high probability of not controlling her fertility, they have a high probability of becoming
poor fathers. It reduces their incentive to marry; this eﬀect will be strong among poor men.
The wife's expected well-being is denoted Û f ≡ En[u(cf (n), n)|N̂ ] and the husband's Ûm ≡
En[u(cf (n), n)|N̂ ].
3.2 First stage: marriage decisions
During the last stage of the game, agents know if they are sterile or not and if they are able
to freely determine their number of children. Nevertheless, they have to decide to marry or
to remain single before obtaining this information and hence calculate the expected value
of a marriage oﬀer. We denote Mf (ef , af , em, am) the value of accepting a marriage oﬀer
from a man endowed with em and am for a woman enjoying an education ef and a non labor
income af :
Mf (ef , af , em, am) = (χf + (1− χf )χm) U˜ f
+ (1− χf − (1− χf )χm)
(
κ(ef )U
f + (1− κ(ef ))Û f
)
where χf and χm respectively describe the percentage of females and males who are naturally
sterile. For a man with an education em and a non labor income am, the value of a marriage
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oﬀer coming from a woman endowed with {ef , af} is:
Mm(em, am, ef , af ) = (χm + (1− χm)χf ) U˜m
+ (1− χm − (1− χm)χf )
(
κ(ef )U
m + (1− κ(ef ))Ûm
)
.
S(ei, ai) denotes the expected value of being single with education ei and non labor income
ai. It is written respectively for a woman and a man:
S(ef , af ) = χf V˜ f + (1− χf )V f
S(em, am) = V m.
A match on the marriage market will end up married only if both partners are willing, that
is to say if and only if
Mf (ef , af , em, am) ≥ S(ef , af ) and Mm(em, am, ef , af ) ≥ S(em, am). (9)
In Appendix E, we study the case where only the consent of the groom is needed for a
marriage to occur.
Some properties of the model will be crucial to ﬁt the stylized facts we have exposed in
the previous section. The U-shaped pattern of childlessness in the data is related to the
coexistence of the various types of childlessness and the way their intensity varies with
education. Natural sterility is not at stake here as we have assumed it is uniformly distributed
across the population.23 On the contrary, social sterility is closely related to poverty, as it
arises when income is not suﬃcient to allow the woman to consume at least cˆ. It therefore
decreases with income and explains why total childlessness decreases with education at low
levels of education. Finally, voluntary childlessness arises when, despite being fertile and
not facing a binding economic constraint on their decisions, single women or couples decide
not to have children. Those who are concerned by this situation are women earning high
salary incomes, and, hence, having a greater opportunity cost to raise children.24 Voluntary
childlessness is responsible for the increasing pattern of childlessness rates, at high levels of
education.
23If the law of large numbers applies, a share χf of single women will be sterile while the share of sterile
couples will be higher and equal to χf +(1−χf )χm. The prevalence of natural sterility depends on education
only indirectly, through the marriage rate.
24Notice that, as shown by Baudin, de la Croix, and Gobbi (2015), this is true only when, after an increase
in wf , the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect, which is more likely to arise in families with
suﬃciently high male wages and non labor incomes.
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Concerning the pattern of marriages rates we observe in the data, the following elements are
important. First, the risks of sterility as well as of unwanted pregnancies can be powerful
incentives to stay single. Sterility can be natural but also due to poverty. It implies that a
poor man has a low incentive to marry a poor woman as the risk of being sterile because of
poverty is great. Furthermore, marrying a woman with low education increases the risk of
losing control over fertility during marriage. For a rich man, this only means having many
children while for a poor man, it means suﬀering consumption deprivation. This mechanism
has a negative impact on the degree of endogamy. On the other hand, the sharing rule
withing marriage aﬀects the degree of endogamy positively.
Child mortality is also crucial to marriage decisions. The risk of ending up with zero children
due to mortality lowers men's willingness to marry as having children is the main advantage
of marriage for a man. In this case, the single woman or the couple is neither naturally
nor socially sterile. For any woman endowed with ef and giving birth to N children, the
probability of being childless because of mortality is P (0|N) = (1−q(ef ))N . If the law of large
numbers applies, the proportion of women who are childless because of child mortality in each
category of education equals
∑NM
N=0 η{N,ef}(1−q(ef ))N , with η{N,ef} describing the proportion
of women with an education level equal to ef who had N births. As the probability that
a newborn survives is positively correlated to his/her mother's education, mortality driven
childlessness is not uniformly distributed across the population. It is not necessarily greater
among low-educated women than among highly educated women. Indeed, low-educated
women face a higher risk that each of their children will die but have a higher fertility rate
when they are not sterile; while highly educated women face a lower risk but have fewer
children.
4 Identiﬁcation of the Parameters
The objective is to use the theory developed above to decompose the observed childlessness
into its four components and, by conducting policy experiments, analyze whether taking the
extensive margin of fertility into account matters. For this purpose we ﬁrst estimate the
parameters from the data.
4.1 A Priori Information
Some parameters are ﬁxed a priori. The two sterility parameters are ﬁxed at 1%. The
percentage of naturally sterile couples, χf +(1−χf )χm, is then equal to 1.9%. This allows us
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to match the lowest childlessness rates in our sample (Nicaragua, Rwanda, and Vietnam).25
To compute wages, we need to know the parameters ρ, which is the Mincerian return of one
additional year of education, and γ, which denotes the gender wage gap. 10% is a usual
yardstick for the Mincerian return to years of schooling. Evidence for developing countries
is however mixed. Old evidence shows that rates of return to investment in education in
developing countries are above this benchmark. Recent country speciﬁc studies, however, ﬁnd
lower returns, closer to 5% (see the survey of Oyelere (2008) for Africa). As we impute this
return starting from the ﬁrst year of education, we have decided to be relatively conservative
and set ρ = 0.05. A robustness analysis to this assumption is provided in Appendix E where
we use the values provided in Montenegro and Patrinos (2014). Country speciﬁc gender
wage gaps γ are computed from the Global Gender Gap Report (Hausmann et al. 2013)
normalizing the measure to 1 for Iceland, the country with the smallest gap in the world.
For a few countries (Haiti, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Palestine), data are not available, and
the sample average (0.794) was imputed to them. All the resulting γs are shown in Table 10.
All wages are ﬁnally normalized so that the maximum wage (that of a man with 18 years of
schooling) is equal to one.
4.2 Minimum Distance Estimates
We next identify the remaining 9 parameters of the model using the Simulated Method of
Moments (SMM). The moments are the marriage rates of men and women, the completed
fertility of mothers and the childlessness rates among both singles and married women, for
the 19 education categories. This sums to 114 moments. As there is an equal number of men
and women in the model, we adjust the marriage rate of men to equal the marriage rate of
women in each economy. The objective function to minimize is given by:
f(p) = [d− s(p)] [W ] [d− s(p)]′
where p is the vector of the parameters of the model, d denotes the vector of empirical
moments and s the vector of simulated moments, depending on the parameters. W is a
diagonal weighting matrix with 1/d2 as elements, implying that we minimize the sum of
25The ideal population to measure sterility among couples is one in which marriage is associated with the
desire to have children, women marry young, do not divorce (e.g. because of sterility), are faithful to their
husbands and live in a healthy environment. The closest to this ideal are Hutterites. According to (Tietze
1957), who studies sterility rates among this population, we should set the percentage of naturally sterile
couples, χf + (1− χf )χm, at 2.4%. In our sample here, couples from Nicaragua, Rwanda and Vietnam are
even less childless than Hutterites.
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squared deviation in percentage terms. The minimization is performed under the constraint
of reproducing the aggregate marriage rate perfectly. We impose this constraint in order
to compute the aggregate childlessness rates with the right weights of singles and married
people.
To compute simulated moments, we consider a large number of women (100, 000) for each
category of education. For each woman, we draw her non-labor income from an exponential
distribution written as −β lnx where x is drawn from a uniform distribution [0, 1] and β is
the mean of the exponential distribution. For each woman in each category of education,
we also draw a potential husband from the empirical distribution of education levels among
men.26 For each level of men's education, the non-labor income is drawn from the same
distribution as for women. Each woman, given her education and country, also faces survival
probabilities for her children, taken from Table 17, and a probability of not controlling her
fertility, taken from Table 20. Given these probabilities, we compute the expected utility if
married and single, and the expected utility of the possible husband we have drawn for her.
We thus obtain a decision about marriage for each person. Then, drawing realizations for
mortality and fertility control shocks, we compute her actual fertility. For each category of
education for women, we therefore obtain a large number of decisions about marriage and
fertility that we can average, and calculate the simulated moments.
We estimate the parameters assuming, ﬁrst, that they are common to all countries, hence
matching global moments only, and, second, that parameters are country speciﬁc. The third
column of Table 2 shows the values of parameters estimated using the global moments. The
last three columns show the range of the values of the parameters when they are allowed to
be country speciﬁc. Appendix C shows the values and distribution of the parameters for all
countries.
The parameters β, cˆ and µ should be interpreted in light of the normalization for wages. Their
value implies that a single woman with average non-labor income (0.28) and no education
(wf = 0.32) cannot pay the cost µ and consume cˆ. The parameters φ, α and δ
f imply
an upper bound on fertility of 6 children for married women and 4 for single women. The
diﬀerence between δm and δf is noteworthy (and it is present in a large majority of countries):
it implies that the gain from marriage in terms of time accrues mostly to men, who seem
less eﬃcient than women to manage their life when single.
Using the estimated value of the parameters, Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the empirical and
simulated moments. The dashed lines represent the simulated moments when the parameters




Description p Value Min Mean Max
Mean of the exponential distribution β 0.278 0.152 0.372 0.807
Preference parameter ν 6.773 5.119 7.029 9.249
Minimum consumption level to be able to procreate cˆ 0.345 0.081 0.306 0.538
Goods cost to be supported by a household µ 0.230 0.045 0.293 0.565
Fraction of childrearing to be supported by women α 0.797 0.663 0.871 0.999
Time cost for one child φ 0.207 0.131 0.184 0.230
Time cost of being single (men) δm 0.262 -0.028 0.194 0.439
Time cost of being single (women) δf 0.080 -0.131 0.124 0.429
Bargaining parameter θ 0.722 0.010 0.632 0.948
Table 2: Identiﬁed parameters for all countries
are obtained by ﬁtting the global moments. We see that the model allows replicating all
the empirical patterns qualitatively. The solid gray line represents the moments obtained by
aggregating country speciﬁc simulated moments. The ﬁt is even better, not surprisingly.27
The ﬁt of the model in terms of childlessness rates is given in Figure 5. We correlate the
observed level of childlessness with the simulated one. The model explains 97% of the
variation in childlessness across countries, when allowing the structural parameters to diﬀer
across them.
Appendix B sheds light on how each of the parameters of the structural model is identiﬁed
from the data. For example, Figure 6 shows how the slope of the relationship between
childlessness and education changes after a 20% increase in the estimated value of cˆ and
α respectively, all else kept constant. A higher cˆ increases poverty driven childlessness
but leaves voluntary childlessness unchanged. A higher α, on the contrary, mostly aﬀects
voluntary childlessness.28 We can then infer that cˆ is identiﬁed from the decreasing part of
the U-shaped relationship between childlessness and the education of married women while
α is identiﬁed from the increasing part of the U-shaped relationship.
27The theory predicts a (small) positive relationship between the marriage rates of men and their education,
which is not present in the data. This might be due to the assumption that children are a superior good and
hence highly educated men have a very high incentive to marry, as otherwise they cannot become fathers.
28To be precise, Appendix B shows that changing α and cˆ also aﬀects marriage decisions. A higher α gives
to men an extra incentive to accept a marriage with a low-educated woman as his opportunity cost in terms
of foregone income due to childrearing diminishes. A higher cˆ has the opposite eﬀect: men are less willing to
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Note: Morocco, Indonesia, Thailand and Palestine are excluded as we do not
have the information on the childlessness of singles for them.
































Figure 6: Identiﬁcation of cˆ (solid gray) and α (dashed gray).
4.3 Decomposition of Childlessness
Using the theory and the estimated parameters, we show the decomposition of the sources
of childlessness for the 36 developing countries considered in Table 3. Globally, we estimate
that only 2.1% of women are childless because the opportunity cost of childrearing is too
great. The remaining women's childlessness is due to involuntary reasons. 3.8% of women
26
are childless due to poverty and 0.6% because all their children died. The highest levels of
voluntary childlessness are found in Argentina and Colombia (respectively 9.0 and 6.4%).
Childlessness caused by poverty is maximal in Cameroon (16.2%), while Liberia, Mali and
Sierra Leone have a rate of poverty driven childlessness above 10%. Mortality driven child-
lessness is at its maximum in Malawi (1.4%), and at its minimum in Kenya, Jamaica and
Panama (0.1%)29.
simulation data simulation data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ARG 12.9 9.0 1.3 0.7 1.9 13.9 KEN 4.1 0.0 2.0 0.1 1.9 4.0
BOL 6.0 0.8 2.8 0.6 1.9 6.1 LBR 13.6 0.3 11.0 0.4 1.9 12.7
BRA 11.5 4.6 4.3 0.8 1.9 11.9 MAR 5.5 0.6 2.5 0.5 2.0 5.2?
CHL 8.8 4.9 1.7 0.4 1.8 8.9 MLI 15.9 0.3 13.0 0.7 1.9 16.3
COL 12.6 6.4 4.0 0.4 1.8 12.8 MWI 5.1 0.5 1.3 1.4 2.0 5.9
CRI 7.8 3.0 2.8 0.2 1.8 7.5 RWA 3.8 0.0 1.7 0.2 1.9 3.5
DOM 6.6 1.8 2.2 0.6 1.9 7.1 SEN 6.6 0.4 3.8 0.5 1.9 6.9
ECU 9.6 3.9 3.6 0.3 1.9 10.1 SLE 13.8 0.4 10.4 1.1 1.9 13.5
HTI 8.4 0.7 5.1 0.7 1.9 10.0 TZA 5.1 0.0 2.6 0.5 1.9 5.4
JAM 6.2 4.5 0.0 0.1 1.6 8.4 UGA 5.8 0.1 3.4 0.4 1.9 6.0
MEX 8.9 3.4 3.4 0.3 1.9 8.9 ZAF 8.3 0.9 5.4 0.2 1.8 8.4
NIC 5.5 1.4 2.1 0.2 1.9 5.5 ZMB 9.7 0.6 5.8 1.3 2.0 10.3
PAN 5.6 1.6 2.0 0.1 1.9 5.5 IDN 4.1 0.0 1.4 0.7 2.0 4.2?
PER 4.8 0.7 2.0 0.2 1.9 5.9 KHM 7.5 0.5 4.9 0.3 1.9 8.8
SAL 9.2 2.5 4.6 0.3 1.8 9.4 THA 5.3 0.5 2.4 0.4 2.0 5.7?
URY 11.3 3.0 6.0 0.4 1.9 12.3 VNM 6.4 1.7 2.6 0.2 1.9 7.2
VEN 7.8 5.7 0.1 0.2 1.8 8.3 WBG 4.5 2.2 0.0 0.3 2.0 4.0?
CAM 18.7 0.4 16.2 0.4 1.8 17.8
GHA 10.1 2.1 5.1 0.9 1.9 9.8 All 8.5 2.1 3.8 0.6 1.9 9.0
Note: (2): opportunity cost driven childlessness (voluntary), (3): poverty driven child-
lessness, (4): mortality driven childlessness, (5): natural sterility, (1): (2)+(3)+(4)+(5).
? indicates childlessness rates for married only.
Table 3: Decomposition of childlessness into its four components (%), by country
Figure 7 correlates the two main types of childlessness, poverty-driven childlessness and
29One may be surprised to ﬁnd the lowest rate of mortality driven childlessness in countries with high
mortality like Kenya (or even Rwanda). The reason behind this result is that such countries are characterized
by a high completed fertility of married and single mothers (see Tables 11 and 12) and a low dispersion of
this fertility across education categories. As very large families are the norm, the share of these families
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Figure 7: Estimates for poverty driven childlessness (top) and childlessness due to a too high
opportunity cost of childrearing (bottom).
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opportunity-cost-driven childlessness with the mean education level of each country. The
ﬁgure also displays these two sources of childlessness as a function of education in the artiﬁcial
economy with global parameters (dotted line with squares). A one-year rise in school life
expectancy reduces social sterility by 0.75 percentage points on average (from the regression
line of ﬁgure 7's top panel). There are some outliers, notably Cameroon, with unusually
high levels of poverty driven childlessness given their level of development.30 The part
of childlessness that is driven by a high opportunity cost emerges along with economic
development. From the artiﬁcial global economy, voluntary childlessness rises above 4% for
education categories with more than 10 years of schooling. Across countries, one-year rise in
school-life expectancy increases voluntary childlessness by 0.57 percentage points.31 Figure 7
conﬁrms the intuitions of Poston and Trent (1982) according to whom, as a country develops,
childlessness decreases to a minimum level because of the reduction of subfecundity and then
increases because of voluntary reasons. The minimum level of childlessness is attained when
voluntary childlessness is still negligible, that is when the population has an average level of
education of about 6 to 7 years of schooling.
5 Policy Experiments
In addition to decomposing fertility into its margins, we quantify the impact of three devel-
opment policies on them. The policies we study are those recommended by most national
and international organizations, and non governmental organizations: putting an end to
unwanted births,32 eradicating child mortality33 and closing the gender wage gap.34 Notice
that we do not model the relative cost of these policies, which prevents us from providing a
full-ﬂedged cost-beneﬁt analysis.
30Cameroon belongs to a region labeled as the African Infertility Belt due to the high prevalence of
childlessness.
31Each point of the dotted line represents childlessness in a hypothetical country where all citizens have
the same education level. The cloud of countries lies above this line because there is inequality in actual
countries: as the relationship between childlessness and education is convex, averaging childlessness in one
country with dispersed levels of education leads to a higher level of childlessness than in the hypothetical
economy with no inequality.
32Fact sheet# 351 of the World Health Organization states that family planning is key to slowing unsus-
tainable population growth and the resulting negative impacts on the economy, environment, and national
and regional development eﬀorts.
33Target 4.A of the Millennium Development Goals is to reduce the under-ﬁve mortality rate by two-thirds,
between 1990 and 2015.
34Achieving our objectives for global development will demand accelerated eﬀorts to achieve gender equal-
ity and women's empowerment. Otherwise, peace and prosperity will have their own glass ceiling. Hillary
Clinton, Jan 2012.
29
The completed fertility in the population F can be decomposed as:
F = m (1− Cmarried) nmarried + (1−m) (1− Csingle) nsingle
where m is the marriage rate, C is the childlessness rate, and n is the fertility of mothers.
The long-term impact of a policy on completed fertility does not only depend on the eﬀect on
the fertility of mothers, but also on how marriage rates and childlessness rates are aﬀected.
Figures (8) to (10) summarize the outcome of simulating the global model under the three
policies on m, C and n.35 They show how the next generation would adjust its behavior as
a consequence of each policy, everything else being equal.
5.1 Simulation of Policies
We start by considering a perfect family planning program which sets the percentage of
couples able to control their fertility κ equal to 1, making unwanted births disappear. The
fertility of low-educated married mothers accordingly decreases (left panel of Figure 8).
When married women have full control over their fertility, there is less uncertainty concerning
the outcome of marriage (mortality remains) and everybody is also more willing and likely to
marry: the dashed-gray line of Figure 10 is systematically above the black line (benchmark).
The eﬀect is stronger for low-educated people who are more subject to unwanted pregnancies.
The rise in marriage rates decreases childlessness rates among low-educated single women
(right panel of Figure 9). This happens because marrying a low-educated woman becomes
less risky. A selection into marriage occurs among low-educated women; those with the
lowest non-labor income are more prone to accept marriage than those with high non labor
income (who rely less on marriage to be protected against poverty and social sterility). This
selection leaves low-educated women who are less concerned with social sterility single. This
reduces the prevalence of involuntary childlessness among single women. As married women
can now control their fertility, they will also be more likely childless, if optimal (left panel of
Figure 9). As more poor women marry, this also increases marital childlessness rates among
the low-educated. On the whole, social sterility changes from 3.8% to 2.1% for the average
country.
Taking all these eﬀects into account, eliminating unwanted births lowers the completed
fertility from 3.47 to 3.00 children on average per woman for the entire population. This
drop of 0.47 children lies just below the lower bound of May (2012)'s prediction concerning
35Using the model with country speciﬁc parameters instead does not yield diﬀerent qualitative results at
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Figure 8: Fertility of married (left) and single (right) mothers. Benchmark (black), no
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Figure 9: Childlessness rates of married (left) and single (right) women. Benchmark (black),
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Figure 10: On the left, marriage rates of women (left) and men (right). Benchmark (black),
no mortality (gray), no unwanted births (dashed gray) and no gender gap (dotted gray).
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the eﬃciency of family planning on reducing fertility. At the country level, we ﬁnd that for
many African countries the eﬀect of such a policy lies below this bound. This is the case of
Mali for example, for which fertility drops by 0.15 (from 4.17 to 4.02 children). Conversely,
family planning remains a strong engine of fertility decline in Vietnam where it reduces
total fertility by 0.79 (from 2.97 to 2.18 children). This result is in line with Baudin and
Gobbi (2014) who propose a synthetic index of the needs for population policies in developing
countries. They argue that nowadays, most African countries need population policies which
aﬀect the deep determinants of fertility rather than the proximate ones while this is not the
case in Asian countries like Vietnam. The main reason behind this result is that African
countries have been the main recipients of family planning programs during the last decades.
DHS data shows indeed that unwanted births are much more prevalent in Vietnam than in
Mali (Table 20).
Let us now consider the second policy which eradicates child mortality (q(·) = 1). Figure 8
shows that the reduction of mortality increases the fertility of mothers, in particular for the
poorly educated. The eﬀect is of the order of half a child for a mother with no education.36
In addition to this well-known eﬀect, marriage and childlessness rates vary. The childlessness
rate of married women recedes from 4.3 to 3.6% while it increases from 50 to 59% among
single women (Figure 9). The explanation we can derive from the theory is the following.
Child mortality rates are higher among poorly educated women who are also more likely
to experience unwanted pregnancies. Child mortality then helps families who have more
children than optimal to regulate their size. A reduction in mortality rates then increases the
risk in terms of potential consumption loss for males from marrying low-educated women, this
is especially important for poor males. This makes a man less likely to accept a marriage oﬀer
from a low-educated woman but also a low-educated woman less likely to accept any oﬀer
(Figure 10). Indeed, when single, a woman is not concerned by uncontrolled fertility. This
implies that low-educated women are more likely to be single and hence childless. The theory
predicts that social sterility increases from 3.8% to 5.9% after this shock. This highlights an
interesting mechanism on how mortality allows to regulate fertility. This mechanism is in
line with Malthusian theory according to which child mortality has some virtues. A policy
implication of this result is that promoting health without family planning can be costly for
poor women.
Similarly to eliminating unwanted births, eradicating child mortality has a limited impact
on average fertility at the global level but a dramatic one in countries which are strongly
concerned by child mortality. At the global level, we ﬁnd that completed fertility remains
36With uncertainty about child survival, parents tend to have fewer children than needed to compensate
for those who will die. This has been described as under shooting in previous studies (see Baudin (2012)).
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almost unchanged: from 3.47 to 3.61 (fertility increases on the intensive margin but decreases
on the extensive margin). For Sierra Leone, where we ﬁnd the highest mortality rates
(Table 17), the policy increases average fertility by 1.31 children (from 3.79 to 5.10). In this
case, both margins of fertility increase, so accounting for the extensive margin of fertility
magniﬁes the already known eﬀect of child mortality. Child mortality rates are also high
in Rwanda, where eradicating child mortality increases completed fertility by 1.26 children.
Contrary to Sierra-Leone, childlessness in Rwanda increases with the drop in mortality,
counteracting the rise in completed fertility. Social sterility increases from 1.7% to 6.3% in
Rwanda. Hence, our theory predicts that, in some countries, the eradication of mortality
goes hand in hand with an increase in social sterility, which reﬂects a pauperization among
uneducated women.
The last policy consists in removing the gender gap on the labor market. To ﬁx ideas, this
implies that γ goes from 0.79 to 1.00 in the average country (but from 0.67 to 1.00 in Morocco,
which is the country with the strongest gender gap). Or, in other words, gender equality
becomes similar to the one in Iceland all over the world.37 Beyond making women richer,
such a policy also increases women's bargaining power θ. In this last sense, it empowers
women within their couple.38
The ﬁrst direct eﬀect of this policy is to make women relatively richer than in the benchmark.
This implies that the gains from marriage will be lower and hence highly educated women
will marry less (Figure 10, left panel). The eﬀect on fertility rates is negative due to a
higher opportunity cost to raising children for both single and married women (Figure 8).
In addition, Figure 9 shows that the eﬀect on childlessness is negative for poorly educated
women (who are now richer and suﬀer less from social sterility) while it is positive for highly
educated women (for whom the opportunity cost is greater).
We predict that closing the gender wage gap increases total childlessness from 8.5% to
11.9%. Voluntary childlessness rises from 2.1% to 6.6% and social sterility declines from
3.8% to 2.5%. In Mali, for example, closing the gender wage gap decreases social sterility
37Notice that the gender equality we are dealing with is of the type economic participation and sup-
port, and is not related to educational attainment, or to health and survival, which are other important
dimensions of gender discrimination.
38Another way to empower women consists in sharing childrearing time equally between women and men.
To analyze this policy in a meaningful way, one should model the time use choice of the households (see
Gobbi (2014) on this issue), and the incentives that a government can manipulate to decentralize such a
policy. In the absence of such a framework, one can still get a preview of this policy by setting α = 12 . Such
a parameter change leads to various eﬀects. Marriage rates are reduced (rich men do not want to marry
any more), which reduces fertility, but couples who do not control their fertility achieve a higher number of
children because their time constraint is less binding thanks to husbands' participation to domestic tasks.
On average, fertility increases.
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from 13.0% to 10.1% and increases voluntary childlessness from 0.3% to 1.8%. In addition to
its eﬀect on childlessness, closing the gender gap also seems a very eﬀective policy to reduce
fertility rates (Figure 8). We already knew from the literature that it may lower total fertility
rates (Diebolt and Perrin 2013). Here we highlight another channel, childlessness, which can
either amplify or hamper the eﬀect of the intensive margin on average fertility. This depends
on whether the positive eﬀect of social sterility on completed fertility dominates the negative
one of voluntary childlessness.
Next, we analyze whether the extensive margin of fertility and marriage rates matter for the
impact of the three policies on completed fertility.
5.2 Importance of Endogenous Marriage and Childlessness
Compared to the literature, we add marriage and childlessness as endogenous engines of the
changes in completed fertility. Here, we ask what the impact of these two channels is on
completed fertility when implementing the three policies considered in the last section. How
diﬀerent is it from the impact of the intensive margin alone? This question is crucial as one
goal of international organizations is to limit population growth rates in the near future.
To answer this question we will compute the partial change in fertility as:
∆Fp = m (1− Cmarried) ∆nmarried + (1−m) (1− Csingle) ∆nsingle
and compare it to the total change, which also accounts for changes in marriage and child-
lessness:
∆F = ∆Fp + ((1− Cmarried) nmarried − (1− Csingle) nsingle) ∆m
−m nmarried ∆Cmarried − (1−m) nsingle ∆Csingle
Table 4 compares the variation of completed fertility predicted by our model ∆F to ∆Fp.
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The latter depicts a situation where childlessness and marriage rates are ﬁxed to their bench-
mark values.40 At the global level, the endogeneity of childlessness and marriage rates lowers
the impact of health and family planning while it magniﬁes the impact of closing the gender
39For simplicity, we show only 16 among the 36 countries. The complete list can be found in Appendix D.
The countries considered here are those for which we have data on unwanted births (Appendix A.2), on the
fertility of single women, and for which there are more than 30,000 married women.
40As the equilibrium on the marriage market has no impact on individual decisions, this way of calculating
the marginal contribution of our mechanisms is valid.
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Country Benchmark Fert. Perfect family planning No child deaths Female empowerment
∆F/F ∆Fp/F ∆F/F ∆Fp/F ∆F/F ∆Fp/F
BOL 3.41 -3.17 -3.99 20.51 21.14 -5.00 -3.98
BRA 2.75 -18.28 -20.32 2.86 4.87 -13.98 -7.19
COL 3.07 -9.59 -9.36 3.34 3.49 -12.58 -7.21
DOM 3.12 -5.23 -5.30 4.67 4.07 -13.80 -10.82
HTI 3.97 -12.97 -11.81 12.10 13.32 -7.57 -6.67
PER 3.41 -11.39 -13.17 3.32 4.31 -8.83 -8.11
URY 3.07 -14.57 -15.27 1.95 2.10 -14.06 -8.80
GHA 3.95 -13.34 -12.31 7.66 7.92 -9.23 -8.00
KEN 5.32 -2.59 -3.92 12.21 13.57 -1.90 -3.19
MLW 4.17 -3.69 -2.07 19.49 16.65 -11.49 -12.26
RWA 4.87 -3.33 -4.71 25.99 31.69 0.34 -1.28
UGA 5.34 -5.06 -4.68 18.44 18.80 -4.86 -5.67
ZAF 3.74 -2.92 -2.35 6.64 5.92 -4.83 -3.42
ZMB 4.15 -11.80 -11.02 9.15 9.49 -7.78 -8.57
KHM 3.68 -6.48 -6.38 6.62 5.68 -12.53 -10.53
VNM 2.97 -26.55 -28.78 0.83 1.35 -10.15 -8.43
All 3.47 -13.63 -15.00 4.10 5.69 -11.88 -8.46
Table 4: Impact in percentages of policies in the case where childlessness and marriage
are endogenous (∆F/F) and in the case where childlessness and marriage are ﬁxed to their
benchmark values (∆Fp/F).
wage gap. We could conclude from this result that our mechanisms only reﬁne the results
without considering childlessness and marriage as endogenous. This would be a mistake
when looking at speciﬁc countries for which the impact of policies can be radically diﬀerent
depending on whether we consider ∆Fp instead of ∆F. For example in Brazil, the disap-
pearance of child mortality increases completed fertility by 2.86% when accounting for the
marriage and childlessness channels while with exogenous childlessness and marriage, com-
pleted fertility increases by 4.87%. The diﬀerence is even bigger in Rwanda, which is the
country with the highest child mortality in the list. From the DHS data (Table 9, fourth
column) Peru, Rwanda and Vietnam are the countries with the highest percentage of un-
wanted births. We see that for these countries the estimated eﬀect of the family planning
policies is always lower than in the case where the marriage and childlessness channels are
ignored. The reverse is true in Haiti, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa and Zambia where the
endogenous adjustments of childlessness and marriage magnify the impact of family planning
policies. In all these countries, the prevalence of unwanted births is relatively high among
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highly educated women (see Table 20). Then, once they no longer face the risk of experi-
encing unwanted births, a signiﬁcant share of these women decide to remain childless, which
diminishes completed fertility.
Colombia has a high voluntary childlessness component relative to other countries, and the
eﬀect of closing the gender wage gap is much greater than when we neglect the endogeneity
of marriage and childlessness. This endogeneity does not matter much for the impact of the
other policies in Colombia. In the case of Rwanda, considering childlessness and marriage
as ﬁxed leads us to estimate that gender equity reduces completed fertility by 1.28% which
would be in line with the intuition that women with higher wages reduce their number of
children. This intuition is valid but this mechanism is dominated by a strong reduction
of childlessness due to poverty that makes completed fertility increase by 0.34%. These
examples show that eluding adjustments of childlessness and marriage could lead to incorrect
conclusions in terms of economic policies. It also shows that in a country like Rwanda, playing
with the deep determinants of fertility can lead to unexpected increases of completed fertility
due to the reduction of social sterility.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we look at the extensive margin of fertility, how it changes with economic
development, and how it may aﬀect development policy recommendations.
The extensive margin of fertility is endogenous to development. In the poorest countries, it
is mostly composed of social sterility, which reﬂects situations in which women are so poor
that their fecundity is aﬀected, and they end up being childless because of poverty. This
situation echoes Malthus's preventive check.
We propose a methodology to identify the part of childlessness that is related to poverty. It
is based on estimating the structural parameters of an economic model in which both men
and women decide whether to marry and how many children to have. This estimation is
carried out by a simulated method of moment, in which the empirical moments used in the
estimation include fertility, childlessness and marriage rates for 36 developing countries.
Comparing the breakdown of childlessness into its causes across countries, we show that
when a country develops, poverty-driven childlessness diminishes. However, another type of
childlessness appears: voluntary childlessness, which is driven by the high opportunity cost
of having children for more educated individuals.
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The endogeneity of childlessness matters for development policy. When implementing perfect
family planning, the fertility of married mothers of course decreases (by about one child on
average for the poor). This is the usual eﬀect advocated by development agencies. However,
marriage rates increase, because a woman enjoying full control over her fertility is more
likely to marry than a woman facing the risk of having a large number of unwanted children.
This increase in marriage rates raises total fertility in the economy and goes against the ﬁrst
eﬀect. Moreover, the social sterility of poor single women decreases as these poor women
can now more easily ﬁnd a husband. On the whole, taking the endogeneity of marriage and
childlessness into account makes family planning less eﬀective.
Fighting infant mortality is another development policy. Here too, the endogeneity of mar-
riage and childlessness matters. Reducing mortality has little eﬀect on the number of sur-
viving children, because parents know how high mortality is and have a number of births in
accordance. Contrary to what happens when the risk of unwanted birth is reduced, marriage
rates drop. This is because the risk of having many unwanted births is even greater when
there is no child mortality. The drop in marriage rates increases the number of poor single
women substantially, and this increases social sterility in the economy. Hence, lowering infant
mortality may have unexpected consequences for poor single women in society. Moreover,
it does not play an important role for the intensive margin, but it matters for the extensive
one.
The third policy we consider is promoting gender equality on the labor market. Here, better
paid women lead to less social sterility in the economy, and more voluntary childlessness.
In suﬃciently advanced economies, this reinforces the eﬀect on fertility, making the gender
parity policy the most eﬀective one to reduce total fertility. In the least developed countries,
this is not the case though, as the drop in social sterility may counteract the eﬀect on the
intensive margin of fertility.
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Table 5 shows the percentage of men and women by marital status for all available countries.
Table 6 shows the 5th and 95 percentiles for the age of the spouse of married monogamous
women which are used to select the population of men for each country.
Table 7 shows the retained countries and the number of unweighted observations for each of
them.
Notes on education levels.
For some of the countries in Table 7, the education levels are adjusted as follows. Cam-
bodia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zambia have a top code of 13 years
of schooling. For all these countries, we give 16 years of schooling to all the observations
who completed university. In Cambodia, Nigeria and Zambia, we give a value of 14 years
of schooling to those who had a post-secondary technical education (EDATTAND variable).
Peru's top code is 12. We give 13 years of schooling to those who had a post-secondary
technical education and 15 years to those who had completed university. Bolivia, Brazil,
Indonesia, Liberia and Palestine have a top code of 17 years. We do not change the classi-
ﬁcation for these countries. For Haiti, there were observations coded as having completed
secondary education but with less than 11 years of schooling. We dropped these observations.
For Jamaica, we dropped: the observations with more than 5 years of schooling and coded
as having completed less than primary education, the observations with less than 6 years of
schooling and coded as having completed primary, the observations with less than 11 years
of schooling and coded as having completed secondary, and the observations with less than
14 years of schooling and coded as having completed university.
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Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ARG 0.091 0.840 0.000 0.049 0.020 0.081 0.778 0.000 0.081 0.060
BOL 0.105 0.818 0.000 0.039 0.037 0.102 0.755 0.000 0.071 0.071
BRA 0.067 0.840 0.000 0.080 0.013 0.072 0.716 0.000 0.152 0.060
CHL 0.135 0.781 0.000 0.068 0.016 0.155 0.704 0.000 0.102 0.039
COL 0.168 0.752 0.000 0.062 0.019 0.163 0.674 0.000 0.105 0.058
CRI 0.115 0.813 0.000 0.063 0.010 0.131 0.706 0.000 0.129 0.034
DOM 0.090 0.718 0.000 0.177 0.015 0.036 0.658 0.000 0.258 0.048
ECU 0.111 0.791 0.000 0.083 0.015 0.123 0.703 0.000 0.133 0.041
HTI 0.091 0.836 0.000 0.045 0.028 0.068 0.788 0.000 0.077 0.066
JAM 0.333 0.621 0.000 0.034 0.012 0.368 0.582 0.000 0.033 0.017
MEX 0.078 0.859 0.000 0.044 0.019 0.088 0.760 0.000 0.094 0.058
NIC 0.110 0.813 0.000 0.059 0.018 0.103 0.663 0.000 0.170 0.065
PAN 0.163 0.735 0.000 0.091 0.011 0.102 0.692 0.000 0.179 0.027
PER 0.114 0.821 0.000 0.046 0.019 0.087 0.778 0.000 0.090 0.045
SAL 0.135 0.810 0.000 0.040 0.015 0.196 0.655 0.000 0.090 0.058
URY 0.104 0.808 0.000 0.073 0.015 0.082 0.744 0.000 0.129 0.045
VEN 0.154 0.767 0.000 0.067 0.013 0.140 0.658 0.000 0.156 0.047
CAM 0.095 0.681 0.160 0.029 0.036 0.112 0.492 0.197 0.049 0.150
GHA 0.051 0.840 0.000 0.082 0.027 0.033 0.724 0.000 0.142 0.100
GIN 0.031 0.471 0.456 0.020 0.022 0.007 0.859 0.000 0.027 0.107
KEN 0.044 0.750 0.158 0.030 0.019 0.050 0.607 0.192 0.044 0.107
LBR 0.123 0.766 0.048 0.045 0.017 0.108 0.682 0.043 0.064 0.104
MAR 0.051 0.928 0.000 0.012 0.009 0.077 0.772 0.000 0.053 0.098
MLI 0.033 0.574 0.371 0.006 0.016 0.031 0.422 0.465 0.014 0.068
MWI 0.019 0.922 0.000 0.037 0.022 0.014 0.751 0.000 0.106 0.129
RWA 0.038 0.835 0.062 0.015 0.050 0.033 0.540 0.086 0.034 0.307
SEN 0.044 0.677 0.262 0.009 0.008 0.032 0.380 0.506 0.024 0.057
SLE 0.092 0.588 0.258 0.039 0.023 0.061 0.478 0.297 0.042 0.122
TZA 0.054 0.849 0.000 0.063 0.033 0.051 0.703 0.000 0.123 0.123
UGA 0.050 0.656 0.186 0.072 0.037 0.032 0.519 0.166 0.113 0.171
ZAF 0.160 0.767 0.003 0.046 0.024 0.214 0.626 0.000 0.078 0.082
ZMB 0.030 0.893 0.000 0.041 0.036 0.027 0.682 0.000 0.111 0.180
IDN 0.012 0.945 0.000 0.010 0.033 0.022 0.829 0.000 0.036 0.113
KHM 0.018 0.957 0.000 0.010 0.014 0.053 0.804 0.000 0.050 0.093
THA 0.048 0.908 0.000 0.017 0.027 0.076 0.812 0.000 0.034 0.078
VNM 0.017 0.960 0.000 0.013 0.010 0.047 0.857 0.000 0.031 0.065
WBG 0.013 0.972 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.079 0.821 0.000 0.020 0.080
Table 5: Percentage of men and women by marital status and country. (1): single/never
married, (2): monogamous marriage/in union (monogamous), (3): polygamous marriage,
(4): separated/divorced/spouse absent, and (5): widowed.
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5% 95% 5% 95% 5% 95%
ARG 38 62 PER 37 63 SEN 42 75
BOL 37 62 SAL 36 66 SLE 35 80
BRA 37 63 URY 38 63 TZA 41 72
CHL 38 62 VEN 36 64 UGA 39 71
COL 37 65 CAM 41 70 ZAF 39 62
CRI 37 63 GHA 40 70 ZMB 42 68
DOM 35 66 GIN 43 77 IDN 42 63
ECU 37 63 KEN 42 69 KHM 38 61
HTI 38 67 LBR 39 66 THA 39 61
JAM 35 62 MAR 42 66 VNM 40 54
MEX 39 63 MLI 44 70 WBG 42 67
NIC 36 65 MWI 41 68
PAN 36 64 RWA 40 67
Table 6: 5th and 95 percentiles for the age of the spouse of married monogamous women.
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Number of Observations
Country Code Country Name Year Men Women
Single Married Single Married
ARG Argentina 1991 46,379 426,773 26,991 258,630
BOL Bolivia 2001 8,290 64,465 5,093 37,566
BRA Brazil 2000 80,626 1,010,146 56,802 564,511
CHL Chile 2002 27,772 160,298 21,439 97,221
COL Colombia 2005 85,217 381,504 48,497 200,283
CRI Costa Rica 2000 5,141 36,467 3,704 19,904
DOM Dominican Republic 2010 12,419 98,769 2,596 47,895
ECU Ecuador 2010 18,517 132,191 12,961 74,013
HTI Haiti 2003 6,781 62,523 3,310 38,288
JAM? Jamaica 2001 7,449 13,907 3,347 5,292
MEX Mexico 2010 94,945 1,042,567 79,231 685,238
NIC Nicaragua 2005 5,520 40,876 3,207 20,679
PAN Panama 2010 8,059 36,328 2,870 19,506
PER Peru 2007 37,697 272,159 17,747 158,823
SAL El Salvador 2007 8,460 50,713 7,955 26,518
URY Uruguay 1996 3,895 30,167 2,007 18,306
VEN Venezuela 2001 43,288 215,939 24,189 113,766
CAM Cameroun 2005 10,861 77,613 9,406 41,470
GHA Ghana 2010 10,734 177,005 5,158 111,832
KEN Kenya 1999 3,408 58,019 3,194 38,857
LBR Liberia 2008 3,292 20,460 1,773 11,222
MAR Morocco 2004 6,926 126,201 8,832 88,500
MLI? Mali 2009 2,580 45,461 1,435 19,505
MWI Malawi 2008 1,408 66,764 727 40,179
RWA Rwanda 2002 1,699 37,269 1,380 22,497
SEN Senegal 2002 3,088 47,298 1,504 17,971
SLE Sierra Leone 2004 4,976 31,750 1,552 12,095
TZA Tanzania 2002 13,385 208,581 9,255 127,062
UGA Uganda 2002 8,258 109,317 3,168 51,260
ZAF?? South Africa 2001 53,426 256,875 48,298 141,424
ZMB Zambia 2010 1,897 56,025 1,460 36,646
IDN Indonesia 1995 679 55,683 1,019 39,049
KHM Cambodia 2008 2,219 116,660 5,513 83,624
THA Thailand 2000 3,355 63,908 3,983 42,815
VNM? Vietnam 2009 20,335 1134199 41,053 746,960
WBG Palestine 1997 202 15,217 837 8,711
Total 653,183 6,780,097 471,493 4,068,118
? indicates countries where women are aged 40-49.
?? indicates countries where women are aged 40-50.
Note: The age range of men diﬀers by country according to Table 6.
Table 7: Census data and number of (unweighted) observations.
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A.2 DHS Data
Unwanted births are measured using DHS data as explained in the main text. For some
countries listed in Table 7, the data needed to calculate Measure 2 are not available. For
these countries, we use the estimates of the closest country with respect to the pattern of
the completed fertility of married mothers, by years of schooling. In practice, we regressed
the means of the completed fertility of married mothers for each year of schooling of the
country lacking DHS data on unwanted births on the completed fertility of married mothers
for each year of schooling of another country with DHS data on unwanted births, on the
same continent. These means were taken from our samples from IPUMS international. In
the regression, we used the number of observations by years of schooling of the country
lacking DHS data as weights. The closest country was the one for which the R2 was the
highest. Table 8 shows the countries for which there was no data on unwanted births in DHS
in the missing countries column and the countries for which we used the estimates in the
used countries column.41
Missing countries Used countries Missing countries Used countries
ARG BRA SAL NIC
CHL DOM URY NIC
CRI NIC VEN DOM
ECU DOM CAM KEN
JAM BOL TZA KEN
MEX NIC THA KHM
PAN NIC WBG KHM
Table 8: Countries coupled when there was no data on unwanted births in DHS.
41For Cameroon the estimate of the coeﬃcient relating education to the probability of not controlling
fertility was positive. This is not plausible so we decided to use the estimate for Kenya.
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Country Year Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3 Measure 4 Measure 5 aj ∗ 10 bj
BOL 2008 0.713 0.374 0.313 0.207 0.696 -0.018 0.419
BRA 2010 0.491 0.281 0.238 0.141 0.548 -0.025 0.436
COL 2010 0.385 0.236 0.159 0.033 0.464 -0.028 0.462
DOM 2007 0.334 0.165 0.129 0.036 0.358 -0.017 0.274
ECU 1987 0.609 0.246 0.299
HTI 2012 0.693 0.335 0.278 0.193 0.497 -0.022 0.420
MEX 1987 0.665 0.319 0.720
NIC 2001 0.639 0.347 0.303 0.217 0.572 -0.019 0.419
PER 2012 0.540 0.392 0.307 0.085 0.479 -0.031 0.602
GHA 2008 0.388 0.239 0.159 0.032 0.256 -0.014 0.305
KEN 2008-9 0.539 0.294 0.237 0.108 0.394 -0.004 0.305
LIB 2013 0.427 0.145 0.105 0.069 0.144 -0.007 0.183
MAR 2003-4 0.588 0.373 0.264 0.133 0.379 -0.025 0.443
MLI 20012-13 0.349 0.075 0.048 0.030 0.078 -0.007 0.116
MWI 2010 0.572 0.315 0.260 0.124 0.416 -0.025 0.372
RWA 2010 0.686 0.516 0.432 0.157 0.309 -0.015 0.576
SEN 2012-13 0.416 0.045 0.027 0.041 0.122 -0.003 0.057
SLE 2013 0.347 0.082 0.045 0.050 0.059 -0.005 0.118
UGA 2011 0.568 0.223 0.191 0.122 0.373 -0.007 0.252
ZAF 1998 0.366 0.201 0.116 0.033 0.372 -0.011 0.265
ZAM 2007 0.443 0.200 0.157 0.090 0.298 -0.003 0.189
IDN 2012 0.316 0.185 0.108 0.026 0.224 -0.007 0.211
KHM 2010 0.420 0.260 0.174 0.050 0.235 -0.019 0.339
THA 1987 0.602 0.088 0.402
VNM 2002 0.490 0.419 0.211 0.026 0.354 -0.024 0.537
Table 9: Alternative measures of uncontrolled fertility - data from DHS
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A.3 Data on Education and Gender Wage Gap
ef em γ ef em γ
ARG 7.83 7.79 0.82 KEN 3.83 5.44 0.78
BOL 5.46 7.53 0.84 LBR 2.42 6.08 0.79 ?
BRA 5.97 5.77 0.80 MAR 2.15 3.60 0.67
CHL 9.40 9.49 0.76 MLI 1.08 1.78 0.67
COL 7.30 6.87 0.82 MWI 3.15 5.24 0.79 ?
CRI 7.54 7.50 0.83 RWA 1.99 3.22 0.78
DOM 8.05 7.37 0.79 SEN 2.18 3.07 0.79 ?
ECU 8.90 8.80 0.79 ? SLE 1.79 3.44 0.78
HTI 1.59 2.60 0.78 TZA 2.82 4.29 0.79
JAM 11.34 10.47 0.81 UGA 2.96 5.33 0.81
MEX 8.16 8.48 0.79 ZAF 6.65 6.86 0.86
NIC 5.31 5.40 0.88 ZMB 5.53 7.79 0.72
PAN 10.03 9.39 0.82 IDN 4.82 5.91 0.76
PER 7.96 9.20 0.78 KHM 3.27 5.24 0.75
SAL 5.59 6.25 0.76 THA 4.83 5.55 0.79
URY 8.16 7.43 0.78 VNM 8.00 8.50 0.79
VEN 7.39 7.28 0.81 WBG 6.12 8.03 0.79 ?
CAM 5.14 6.22 0.75 All 6.14 6.68 0.79
GHA 5.44 7.79 0.79
? indicates that we used the average of the sample value for the
respective countries, due to a lack of information.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To illustrate how parameters are identiﬁed from the data, we show the eﬀect of increasing
each parameter by 20% on the simulated moments for total sample in Figures 11 to 14.
For each ﬁgure, the top panel shows the marriage rates of females (left) and males (right),
the middle panel shows the childlessness rates and completed fertility of mothers for married
women and the bottom panel shows the childlessness rates and completed fertility of mothers
for single women. For each parameter change, we kept all the other variables ﬁxed to their
estimated values (third column in Table 2).
Figure 11 shows how a 20% increase in φ and θ changes the simulated moments. The
changes on the curves allow us to infer that θ is identiﬁed from the concavity of the female
marriage curve (top left panel). A higher θ means a higher bargaining weight for the less
educated person in a couple, who in the marriage market will then be more often rejected
if low-educated. Hence, with a higher θ, lowly educated women will be rejected more and
highly educated women will reject more when matched with a man with low education. This
increases the amount of poor women among single and hence childlessness. Parameter φ is
identiﬁed from the mean level of fertility of both single and married women, and from the
mean level of voluntary childlessness which determines the slope of the relationship between
childlessness and education.
Figure 12 shows the same exercise with δf and δm. We can see that both parameters are
identiﬁed from the relationship between marriage rates and education. δm is identiﬁed from
the slope of the relationship between male marriage rates and education (top right panel). A
higher δm incites men to marry more so that they will accept a match with a low-educated
women more often, which allows the alleviation of social sterility. Similarly, δf is identiﬁed
from the slope of the relationship between female marriage rates and education (top left
panel).
Figure 13 does the exercise for β, µ and ν. ν is identiﬁed from the increasing part of the U-
shaped relationship between the childlessness of married women and education (an increase
in ν makes children less valuable). µ is identiﬁed from the mean values of marriage rates:
a higher µ increases the gains from marriage and hence the average marriage rate increases
(top panel). β is identiﬁed from the average fertility rate: a higher non-labor income allows
having more children, all else equal.
From Figure 14, we can provide intuitions on the identiﬁcation of cˆ and α. cˆ is identiﬁed from
the decreasing part of the U-shaped relationship between childlessness and the education of
married women and from the marriage rates of low-educated women. A larger cˆ implies that
59
more women will remain socially sterile and also that poor women are less attractive in the
marriage market as the husband will have to use more of his income in order to allow her to
have children. α is identiﬁed from the increasing part of the U-shaped relationship between
childlessness and the education of married women and the slope of the relationship between
the completed fertility of married mothers and education (middle panels). In married couples,
a larger α makes the opportunity cost of raising children more dependent on the wife's
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Figure 13: Eﬀects of changes in µ (dotted gray), the mean of the exponential distribution of


































































































































































Years of Schooling 
Figure 14: Eﬀects of changes in cˆ and α
64
C Estimated Parameters for Each Country
Country β ν cˆ µ α φ δm δf θ
ARG 0.212 6.585 0.112 0.369 0.663 0.196 0.159 -0.053 0.481
BOL 0.375 5.814 0.382 0.224 0.999 0.200 0.168 0.085 0.668
BRA 0.152 6.868 0.314 0.214 0.836 0.200 0.195 0.003 0.639
CHL 0.288 6.950 0.310 0.203 0.701 0.203 0.208 -0.010 0.252
COL 0.314 7.597 0.446 0.152 0.890 0.200 0.378 0.011 0.334
CRI 0.364 7.091 0.383 0.209 0.931 0.196 0.236 0.055 0.540
DOM 0.254 6.731 0.326 0.245 0.859 0.196 0.210 0.169 0.917
ECU 0.398 7.375 0.395 0.234 0.875 0.199 0.261 0.080 0.781
HTI 0.318 7.666 0.276 0.300 0.850 0.179 0.215 0.178 0.721
JAM 0.578 5.910 0.081 0.045 0.959 0.196 0.131 -0.131 0.190
MEX 0.297 6.654 0.315 0.223 0.854 0.208 0.176 0.065 0.764
NIC 0.447 5.974 0.266 0.224 0.989 0.200 0.176 0.160 0.898
PAN 0.393 7.716 0.305 0.171 0.979 0.173 0.301 0.165 0.861
PER 0.223 5.584 0.311 0.106 0.789 0.230 0.195 0.113 0.221
SAL 0.399 7.177 0.406 0.173 0.878 0.204 0.310 0.047 0.214
URY 0.293 6.844 0.242 0.388 0.864 0.194 -0.015 0.164 0.010
VEN 0.379 7.972 0.157 0.137 0.968 0.189 0.366 0.050 0.855
CAM 0.724 8.449 0.538 0.565 0.906 0.182 0.439 -0.052 0.777
GHA 0.307 8.218 0.319 0.374 0.819 0.168 0.223 0.204 0.797
KEN 0.542 5.119 0.292 0.371 0.849 0.167 -0.007 0.178 0.815
LBR 0.638 7.613 0.458 0.472 0.845 0.169 0.310 0.032 0.918
MAR 0.291 5.671 0.189 0.393 0.878 0.201 0.087 -0.046 0.168
MLI 0.406 9.249 0.273 0.444 0.945 0.144 0.190 0.328 0.825
MWI 0.302 6.349 0.153 0.481 0.671 0.148 -0.028 0.311 0.373
RWA 0.381 5.363 0.275 0.303 0.899 0.151 0.018 0.308 0.709
SEN 0.452 7.548 0.242 0.360 0.898 0.157 0.095 0.293 0.760
SLE 0.395 9.131 0.330 0.363 0.974 0.143 0.162 0.157 0.787
Continued on the next page
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Country β ν cˆ µ α φ δm δf θ
TZA 0.408 6.851 0.256 0.437 0.846 0.146 0.018 0.161 0.688
UGA 0.342 9.233 0.362 0.284 0.948 0.131 0.233 0.206 0.948
ZAF 0.807 6.593 0.507 0.328 0.925 0.203 0.356 0.000 0.719
ZMB 0.397 7.412 0.306 0.423 0.681 0.181 0.235 0.371 0.803
IDN 0.240 5.753 0.319 0.291 0.865 0.188 0.224 0.238 0.341
KHM 0.277 6.580 0.151 0.318 0.986 0.189 0.003 0.429 0.707
THA 0.166 7.594 0.367 0.207 0.860 0.195 0.293 -0.020 0.905
VNM 0.090 6.617 0.315 0.169 0.837 0.199 0.191 0.004 0.085
WBG 0.554 9.281 0.140 0.498 0.727 0.136 0.248 0.065 0.979
Table 21: Estimated values of the parameters, by country
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Figure 15: Distribution for β (left:black), cˆ (left:light gray), µ (left:gray), and ν (right)









Figure 16: Distribution for α (left), and θ (right)












Figure 17: Distribution for δf (left:black), δm (left:gray), and φ (right)
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D Policies  All Countries
Country Perfect family planning No child mortality Female empowerment
F ∆F/F ∆Fp/F ∆F/F ∆Fp/F ∆F/F ∆Fp/F
ARG 3.00 -31.13 -32.76 1.04 1.82 -10.98 -2.90
BOL 3.41 -3.17 -3.99 20.51 21.14 -5.00 -3.98
BRA 2.75 -18.28 -20.32 2.86 4.87 -13.98 -7.19
CHL 3.16 -9.26 -10.52 1.25 1.41 -16.77 -11.10
COL 3.07 -9.59 -9.36 3.34 3.49 -12.58 -7.21
CRI 3.56 -6.90 -7.79 3.23 3.27 -11.31 -7.20
DOM 3.12 -5.23 -5.30 4.67 4.07 -13.80 -10.82
ECU 3.27 -3.37 -3.49 3.75 3.21 -15.06 -9.77
HTI 3.97 -12.97 -11.81 12.10 13.32 -7.57 -6.67
JAM 4.02 -0.53 -0.97 2.35 2.07 -13.88 -6.48
MEX 3.28 -9.46 -10.59 3.47 3.55 -14.21 -8.64
NIC 3.80 -4.55 -4.81 9.00 8.05 -4.76 -3.34
PAN 3.98 -3.70 -3.83 6.16 5.54 -7.84 -5.31
PER 3.41 -11.39 -13.17 3.32 4.31 -8.83 -8.11
SAL 3.46 -6.57 -7.02 6.42 6.73 -11.30 -7.52
URY 3.07 -14.57 -15.27 1.95 2.10 -14.06 -8.80
VEN 3.62 -2.63 -2.83 3.84 3.35 -17.57 -10.19
CAM 3.73 -11.16 -5.25 15.04 13.97 -7.44 -6.51
GHA 3.95 -13.34 -12.31 7.66 7.92 -9.23 -8.00
KEN 5.32 -2.59 -3.92 12.21 13.57 -1.90 -3.19
LBR 4.40 -4.62 -2.91 17.15 15.70 -2.94 -4.50
MAR 3.60 -11.46 -9.88 9.00 9.47 -11.28 -9.08
MLI 4.17 -3.69 -2.07 19.49 16.65 -11.49 -12.26
MWI 5.17 -17.40 -16.67 13.58 18.11 -2.65 -3.53
RWA 4.87 -3.33 -4.71 25.99 31.69 0.34 -1.28
SEN 4.64 -1.12 -0.95 13.96 11.75 -7.91 -7.30
SLE 3.79 -2.77 -1.78 34.52 30.15 -6.44 -6.70
TZA 5.27 -7.64 -7.51 15.61 17.99 -3.73 -4.78
UGA 5.34 -5.06 -4.68 18.44 18.80 -4.86 -5.67
Continued on the next page
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Country Perfect family planning No child mortality Female empowerment
F ∆F/F ∆Fp/F ∆F/F ∆Fp/F ∆F/F ∆Fp/F
ZAF 3.74 -2.92 -2.35 6.64 5.92 -4.83 -3.42
ZMB 4.15 -11.80 -11.02 9.15 9.49 -7.78 -8.57
IDN 3.87 -7.69 -7.31 7.40 7.48 -7.68 -8.80
KHM 3.68 -6.48 -6.38 6.62 5.68 -12.53 -10.53
THA 2.84 -17.64 -18.44 1.85 2.23 -17.11 -11.12
VNM 2.97 -26.55 -28.78 0.83 1.35 -10.15 -8.43
WBG 6.29 -9.72 -9.21 7.00 6.39 -6.85 -5.44
All 3.47 -13.63 -15.00 4.10 5.69 -11.88 -8.46
Table 22: Impact of policies in the case where childlessness and marriage are endogenous
(∆F/F) and in the case where childlessness and marriage are ﬁxed to their benchmark values
(∆Fp/F) for all countries
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E Robustness Analysis
In this section, we study the robustness of our analysis to some major changes in assumptions.
In each case, we reestimate the parameters under the new assumption and redo the policy
experiments. We ﬁrst study robustness to the choice of the Mincerian return ρ. Instead of
using a rate of return of education of 5% in all countries, we take the country speciﬁc returns
rates collected in Montenegro and Patrinos (2014). Second, we look at the robustness to
the assumption on marriage. In the main text, we assume that both spouses have to agree
to marry for a marriage to take place (see Equation (9). Here we assume a more machist
society where only the consent of the groom is needed. Third, we allow for some degree of
assortative matching.
E.1 Higher return to education
Table 23 displays the Mincerian return to schooling from Montenegro and Patrinos (2014)
together with the year for which they are estimated. The results obtained under this al-
ternative way of measuring ρ are compared to the benchmark result in Table 24. With the
new ρ the people with low education are much poorer relatively to the highly educated ones:
indeed the wage for people with no education is now 0.136 instead of 0.407 (remember that
the wage of the highest degree of education is normalized to one). As a consequence, the
parameters measuring good costs, µ and cˆ, are lower. The higher value of ρ also modiﬁes
the incentives to accept a marriage oﬀer. In particular, it makes highly educated women less
willing to match with lowly educated men. To counterbalance this eﬀect, the estimated δf
is higher, making singlessness more painful to educated women.
Concerning the ﬁt of the model, we report the value of the minimized objective function
f(p) for the global data, and the R2 of the ﬁt of childlessness across countries (regression on
Figure 5). We see that with the new value of ρ the global ﬁt is worse, but still cross-country
childlessness is matched as before.
The way development aﬀects childlessness is not altered by the new estimation, as the slopes
of the relationship between voluntary childessness and education (bottom panel of Figure 7)
and between poverty driven childlessness and education (top panel of Figure 7) are almost
unchanged. Moreover, the decomposition of childlessness is mildly modiﬁed, with more
poverty driven childlessness with the higher ρ.
Finally, considering the policy experiments, our previous results still hold. It remains true
that neglecting the endogenous response of marriage and childlessness leads to overestimating
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the eﬀectiveness of family planning policies, and to underestimating the eﬀect of promoting
gender equality on fertility. The impact of these two policies on total fertility is however
smaller under the higher values of ρ.
E.2 Machist society
The second robustness exercise replaces the assumption that a match on the marriage market
will end up married only if both partners are willing:
Mf (ef , af , em, am) ≥ S(ef , af ) and Mm(em, am, ef , af ) ≥ S(em, am),
by the assumption that a match will end up married only if the man is willing:
Mm(em, am, ef , af ) ≥ S(em, am).
This change of assumption has major consequences on the estimation. In the benchmark,
the population of single women was composed of poor women who were denied marriage, and
rich women who refused marriage. Now, only the ﬁrst category subsists. As a consequence,
single women are drawn from the poorest part of the society and tend to be much more
childless, while the opposite holds for married women. Estimating the parameters under the
new assumption leads to major change. In particular, the variance of the non labor income
β2 is multiplied by 15 !
Despite the fact that we reestimate the parameters under the new assumption, the ﬁt of this
version of the model is awful. The property that poverty driven childlessness decreases with
development is kept, while the decomposition of childlessness leads to a higher estimate for
the voluntary component (but which is no longer increasing with development). We conclude
that assuming a machist society by just disregarding the interest of women in marriage is
a bad assumption. In societies where the bride has no say, it might remain true that her
interest is somewhat taken into account by her father, as in Doepke and Tertilt (2009).
E.3 Assortative matching
The benchmark model assumes random matching. Alternatively, we assume here that a
share λ of women meets men of the same education level, while a share 1− λ is still subject
to random draws in the whole pool of men.
71
We will let the level of assortativeness λ to be country dependent. In order to measure λ in
our sample, we propose the following non-linear equation:
mef = λ+ (1− λ)mem (10)
where mef is the proportion of women who are married with a partner of the same education
than theirs and mem is the proportion of married men in a given education category. When
λ = 0, mem = mef , which describes the outcome of a purely random matching process, as
assumed in the benchmark. λ denotes then the proportion of women who marry someone
of their type, not due to the randomness part of marriage. The estimates of λ are shown in
Table 23.
Results are presented in the last column of Table 24. Assuming some exogenous degree of
assortative matching would ceteris paribus increase the percentage of households in poverty
driven childlessness. Estimating the model under this assumption, however, shows that the
other parameters adjust to match the observed level of childlessness, leaving most results
unaﬀected by the assumption on assortative matching. Even the estimation of the share of
poverty driven childlessness does not change much. On the whole, the results are very robust
to the introduction of some exogenous degree of assortativeness on the marriage market.
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ρ year λ ρ year λ
ARG 7.8 1992 0.16 KEN 16.9 2005 0.13
BOL 10.4 2001 0.11 LBR 12.4? 0.11
BRA 14.3 2001 0.16 MAR 10 1998 0.16
CHL 13.2 2003 0.16 MLI 13 1994 0.10
COL 11.3 2005 0.14 MWI 9.8 2010 0.14
CRI 9.3 2000 0.17 RWA 17.5 2005 0.15
DOM 9.5 2010 0.11 SEN 11.8 2011 0.08
ECU 7.8 2010 0.12 SLE 4.2 2003 0.10
HTI 8.3 2001 0.13 TZA 15.2 2000 0.10
JAM 11.1 2001 0.18 UGA 16.9 2005 0.12
MEX 10.1 2010 0.16 ZAF 16.5 2001 0.14
NIC 7.7 2005 0.13 ZMB 12.6 2010 0.12
PAN 10 2010 0.11 IDN 12.1 1998 0.16
PER 10.6 2007 0.12 KHM 4.3 2008 0.23
SAL 8.4 2007 0.12 THA 16 2000 0.24
URY 10.9 1996 0.11 VNM 9.4? 0.17
VEN 9.2 2001 0.11 WBG 1.4 1998 0.13
CAM 11.6 2007 0.13
GHA 12.5 2012 0.08 All 11.1 0.15
? value for the region (Table 3a in Montenegro and Patrinos (2014)).
Table 23: Diﬀerent values of the return to schooling ρ (column 2) for given years (column
3) and estimates for the degree of assortativeness in marriage, λ (column 4).
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Benchmark higher ρ machist assortative
marriage matching
Parameters - Global value
β 0.278 0.207 1.067 0.273
ν 6.773 5.747 8.519 7.074
cˆ 0.345 0.137 0.494 0.338
µ 0.230 0.147 0.063 0.243
α 0.797 0.782 0.998 0.803
φ 0.207 0.214 0.167 0.199
δm 0.262 0.126 0.356 0.229
δf 0.080 0.261 -0.101 0.090
θ 0.722 0.794 0.855 0.794
ρ 0.050 0.111 0.050 0.050
λ 0 0 0 0.15
Fit
f(p) global 0.929 1.472 17.709 0.992
R2 0.967 0.967 0.578 0.955
Development and Childlessness
∂ voluntary/∂ schooling 0.57 0.56 -0.02 0.55
∂ pov. driven/∂ schooling -0.75 -0.71 -0.65 -0.77
Decomposition of Childlessness
Voluntary 2.13 1.75 2.96 1.79
Poverty driven 3.83 4.65 4.93 4.26
Mortality driven 0.66 0.33 0.12 0.66
Natural sterility 1.90 1.90 1.88 1.90
Policy Experiments
Planning ∆F/F -13.63 -5.94 -0.38 -13.64
Planning ∆Fp/F -15.00 -6.35 -0.55 -14.99
Health ∆F/F 4.10 7.95 9.64 4.27
Health ∆Fp/F 5.69 7.43 8.13 5.83
Empowerment ∆F/F -11.88 -5.21 -2.29 -11.45
Empowerment ∆Fp/F -8.46 -4.80 -1.98 -8.66
Table 24: Results under Diﬀerent Assumptions
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